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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

POPULATION TO REACH 15 MILLION in 1977

Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech No 52, 27 Dec 76 p 4

[Article by Dr Vladimir Srb, Federal Office of Statistics: "CSSR 1977: 15 Million Inhabitants"]

[Text] The favorable population development in the last 6 years has brought us close to the moment when the CSSR will have 15 million inhabitants. According to the short-term forecast this should happen by the end of March or the beginning of April next year.

As a result of this development the relative aging of the population is slowing down. Of the total number of inhabitants of our republic at the end of this year, 7,609,000 or almost 51 percent were born after the war.

A favorable population development is expected also in the long-term perspective, but the 16 millionth inhabitant will not be born before 1990. According to all prospects the population of our state should reach 16,915,000 by the year 2000.

Long-term population projections have become an increasingly indispensable basis of any planning. In cooperation with the Czech Office of Statistics and Slovak Office of Statistics, the Federal Office of Statistics made new population and household projections up to the year 2000. These projections are based on the definitive results of the 1970 census and have taken into account the favorable population development in recent years.

The new projections used a method different from the previous one. The basis of new projections was the processing of data for okreses in order to make available the required data not only to the federal and national organs, but also to the kraj and okres organs. The kraj, national and federal results thus represent the sum totals of basic data beginning with okreses.

From the standpoint of planning needs, the projections without variants were processed in order to maintain a unity of the number. A variety of methodological problems had to be solved: differentiated fertility in okreses

with the gradually narrowing gap in fertility levels between okreses, krajs, and both republics; the choice of indicators of mortality, that is, life expectancy; a feasible form of computer outputs; the problems pertaining to the effect of migration on the reproduction process, and so on.

As to the expected fertility the projections assume that the present favorable fertility rate will only slightly decline in the future because recent experience with the favorable effect of birth-promoting measures fully justifies it. It is also assumed that the present standstill in the decline of the mortality rate will be overcome and that life expectancy will again slightly increase.

The projections have not taken into account emigration which is of minor importance in the CSSR. On the other hand, attention was paid to internal migration between the CSR and the SSR, and also to the migration between krajs and okreses in Slovakia. The planning organs provided the background material for these computations.

The results of the population projections indicate that the population would increase by 2,565,000 or 17.9 percent during the 30 year 1970-2000 period. It is anticipated that the CSSR will have 16,915,000 inhabitants by the end of the year 2000.

According to these projections, the rate of increase in the SSR will remain almost three times as high as in the CSR. Even the anticipated migration between the CSR and the SSR which should increase the CSR population by 96,000 (the effect of the net migration gain including the subsequent reproduction) by 2000, will not substantially change the results of natural reproduction. Not only the relative, but also the absolute population increase will be bigger in the SSR than in the CSR.

The gradually, though not quite evenly, growing population will result from a different number of live-born children and deaths every year. The diagram [not included] shows averages for each 5-year period. They show reproduction fluctuations which reflect the changing age structure and previous reproduction. According to expectations, the reproduction indicators (fertility and mortality) will undergo smooth development.

The more accurate computations indicate that there will probably be 2.39 live-born children (2.25 in the CSR, 2.69 in the SSR) per woman during the 1976-1980 period, and still 2.25 (2.21 in the CSR, 2.25 in the SSR) during the 1996-2000 period. Such number of children would be sufficient not only for maintaining the present size of the population, but also for achieving further adequate growth. It is anticipated that the net reproduction rate will be 1.07 per woman in the CSSR (1.05 in the CSR, 1.1 in the SSR) during the 1996-2000 period. This reproduction rate which ensures a 7-percent population increase during a 25-year period (the reproduction span of the female generation) conforms also to the estimates of the increase of the national income.

Among the population projections its age structure is the most interesting.

The proportion of children (0-14 years) will first increase from the present 24 percent to 25 percent, but will decline to 23 percent by the end of the century. Although this is a relatively small change, the expected development when expressed in absolute figures must be taken into account (the maximum of 3,968,000 will be reached in 1985). There will be differences in the development in the CSR and the SSR. While the proportion of children will be maintained at 22-24 percent in the CSR, it will drop from the present 27 percent to 24 percent in the SSR, although their absolute number will increase here too.

The total increase in the population of reproductive age (excluding migration) will amount to 1,834,000-864,000 (47.1 percent of the increase) in the CSR, and 970,000 (52.9 percent of the increase) in the SSR. The CSR gain from migration should increase this number by 61,000, while the population increase in Slovakia should be reduced by the same amount.

The size of the population in the postproduction age will be affected by the previous population development, as for example World War I, the economic depression in the 1930's and so on. By the advancement of the small number of people born during those periods into the postproductive age this age group will absolutely increase at a rather low rate (in fact only by the increases in Slovakia), and relatively will be smaller than now. This will create favorable conditions for the solution of a number of social problems.

The number of households should increase by 1.2 million or 25.9 percent during the 30-year period. Increases are expected primarily in Slovakia (679,000), while the increase should amount to only 521,000 in the CSR. A more rapid increase in the number of households in Slovakia is related to the expected reduction of more numerous families and households still existing there. The SSR will witness a more rapid disintegration of households consisting of two or even three generations which are already exceptions in the CSR. The households in Slovakia, however, are expected to be larger than in the Czech krajs even by the year 2000, although the difference will be reduced from the present 0.66 to 0.24 members. The migration between the CSR and the SSR will result in a 26,000 increase in the number of households in the CSR, but will have no effect on the average size of the household either in the CSR or the SSR.

The population development during 1975 and the beginning of 1976 testifies to the fact that the parameters which the projections have taken into account were not exaggerated and that the actual development is very close to the anticipated development.

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HUNGARY

SYMPOSIUM ON SOCIALISM, RELIGION EXAMINES CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

Prologue to Symposium

Budapest VILAGOSSAG in Hungarian No 1, Jan 77 Supplement pp 2-6

[Prologue by Janos Jori]

[Text] Introduction: Selected articles from a supplement entitled "Socialism and Religion--From Speeches Given at a Scientific Conference Held 25-27 October 1976 Under the Auspices of the Pecs Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences."

At a 4 February 1976 conference of the Budapest Party Aktiv, where they discussed practical tasks aimed at realization of the resolutions of the MSZMP 11th Congress, Janos Kadar said the following: "Let me note here also that in regard to believers and the churches we are now in an entirely different situation than we were 5 or 10 years earlier. Without exception the churches are loyal toward our system, they accept socialism as the goal and program of the people of the country.

"Is it possible that the churches are prolonging their own existence this way? It is possible. They also live in the socialist society. But we, working for revolutionary goals, must work with every force ready for cooperation. You may say that this is a compromise. Of course it could be called that. We have learned from Lenin and we represent the thesis that every compromise is acceptable if it aids our revolutionary cause; only that compromise is unacceptable which harms the cause of the revolution. This is not an ideological concession but rather political cooperation being realized in the interest of definite goals. If we live in a mixed society made up of materialists and non-materialists then that is how we will build socialism; only let us build it more quickly and more strongly and let us progress more swiftly." (Janos Kadar, "Agreement in Goals, Unity in Action," TARSADALMI SZEMLE, No 3, 1976, p 18)

Gyorgy Aczel, in harmony with this, writes the following: "It follows from the materialistic historical view of Marxism that in the course of

social struggles one must start not primarily from what people think about themselves--from their world-view or religion--but rather primarily from their objective interests and needs which prescribe common tasks for differing but allied classes and strata.... Practice has proven that what is necessary is also possible: world-view differences do not rule out practical cooperation among religious and non-religious people. We may have different opinions about the created or eternal nature of the material world, about the immortality of the soul, even about the source of moral values. But this difference in view does not rule out the fact that in regard to the tasks of this world religious and non-religious people can agree in all those questions the solution of which is held necessary in the interest of their happiness and social development." (Gyorgy Aczel, "The Socialist State and the Churches in Hungary," VILAGOSSAG, No 10, 1976, p 605)

For the sake of contrast let me quote a few lines from a foreword to a volume of Marx-Engels "On Religion" which appeared in 1961: "In these works Marx and Engels expressed and justified theoretically that proletarian atheism which is an important part of our materialist world-view. They pointed out that science and religious faith are incompatible with one another and they proved that the religious world-view, like all other idealist views, holds back progress.... This collection will be a very useful weapon for atheist propaganda, for the spread of the results of scientific research pertaining to natural and social processes, for a scientific criticism of religion and for the defeat of every reactionary attempt which tries to hold back progress by exploiting religious faith." (Marx-Engels, "On Religion," Kossuth, 1961, p 5)

The foreword, although naturally it contains elements of truth, does not give emphasis to what can be read in the volume: "Religious poverty is an expression of real poverty and at the same time a protest against real poverty.... Religion, as the illusory happiness of the people, comes to an end to the extent that the real happiness of the people is demanded. The illusions nourished by a condition can be given up to the extent that one gives up the condition which forced one into illusions.... A criticism of religion disillusioned man so that he can think and act as a disillusioned man who has returned to reason and can create reality (!)...." (ibid., p 31) This is what Marx wrote in his work titled "Toward a Critique of Hegelian Philosophy, Introduction" at the end of 1843.

Our age has come to the point that one no longer only demands the true happiness of the people; the man of today, directly or indirectly, acts to create reality and thus brings to an end that condition which forces him into illusions, including religion. The chief arena for this action is nothing other than the society of socialism.

The relationship of socialism and religion has its own history. I mean by socialism here that real movement which the proletariat carries out for regaining and liberating itself and thus man.

Feuerbach had already recognized that man lost himself in religion, that, as Marx writes: "Religion is the self-awareness and self-feeling of a man who has not yet gained or who has already lost himself." (op. cit., p 30) "His work consists of dissolving the religious world in the mundane foundation." But he stops here and does not recognize that all this can happen only because "this mundane foundation resembles himself and contradicts himself." Thus the main thing remains for him the vain discovery that the mundane family is the secret of the holy family; not seeing that the "religious nature" is itself a social creature, he is incapable of formulating an ideal which can be realized, the ideal of a theoretical critique of the mundane family and its practical revolutionization. Thus he gets stuck in the concept of enlightenment.

The German social democrat movement, in the 1870's, at the time of the infamous "kulturkampf" of Bismarck, saw very well that the bourgeois governments were trying to cheat the religious freedom more or less consistently realized in the bourgeois revolutions and were trying to distract the attention of the masses from socialism with anti-clerical campaigns.

The Aufklaerung of the Second Internationale then slowly regressed to the behavior of the enlightenment. Lenin disassociated himself from this even before the Russian revolution. He saw clearly that "the struggle against religion cannot be reduced to abstract ideological agitation; this struggle must be linked to the concrete practice of a class movement directed at removing the social roots of religion...and under the conditions of modern capitalist society the class struggle is a hundred times more suited for leading the Christian worker to social democracy and atheism than is mere agitation." ("Lenin's Collected Works," Vol 17, p 392)

In the revolution of 1905 Lenin fought for religious freedom, the goal realized by the bourgeois revolutions of the West; but this struggle was won in Russia by the state of the soviets. And Lenin called on the tradition of "militant materialism" for aid against medievalism. Dogmatism and sectarian practice later accepted this situation mechanically and fell back into the concept of enlightenment.

If we look at conditions in our homeland after the liberation then Jozsef Lukacs is right when he wrote in an article titled "Thirty Years in the History of Hungarian Religious Criticism" (VILAGOSSAG, No 4, 1975, pp 201-209) that "the deficiencies of this period largely arose from a historical situation in which it was necessary to solve together the tasks of the bourgeois democratic and the socialist revolutions;...it would not be correct for us to ascribe the errors and neglects of this period in regard to our theme simply to the personality cult." (p 205) The MKP and the MDP put the struggle against clerical reaction in the center in their practical policies up to about 1950 (the time of the Mindszenty trial and thereafter) and did not include in this the motif of "religious clerical deceit" which existed in the representatives of the French enlightenment.

Without disturbing the feelings of the believer working masses they carried out a political action which was acceptable in the main.

At the same time we should not ignore the fact that primarily after 1950 "this period coincided with the spread of sectarian dogmatism and political schematism which held back a development of the Marxist-Leninist specifics of religious criticism and dealt with religion as a simple and even ephemeral survival of capitalism the overcoming of which was now merely a matter for propaganda.... Nor is it superfluous to point this out today; there are still traces of the belief that faith in God can be eliminated with a few striking arguments and in the meantime a critical analysis of the social basis of religion, its social definition and social psychological peculiarities, is often neglected." (p 205)

I will not deal in detail here with this situation and with its consequences for the religious theory of Marxism. All this has been the subject of examinations by many, including those present.

A development of the religious theory of Marxism which can satisfy the goals of our socialist development was made possible only by practical behavior carried out on the basis of a consistent theoretical position directed against dogmatism and revisionism. The MSZMP has proven with two decades of activity that it has not only sought theoretical inter-dependencies containing what can be realized in practice but in essential and crucial questions it has found them. In my opinion this has made it possible for the practice of church and religion policy to satisfy the needs of the reality of socialism. This was not easy because simultaneous with it we had to liquidate the illusions often deliberately cultivated by sectarian-dogmatic practice that every success of socialism directly and without contradictions meant the creation of relationships in which there no longer appeared the possibility for man to come into conflict with himself.

Some felt they had discovered an unprincipled compromise with religion in a practice which avoided administrative tools and did without direct atheist propaganda campaigns while others greeted this same thing as a convergence of religion and socialism and on this basis considered superfluous not only the spread of the scientific materialist world-view but even the realization of the conscious elements of our development.

The church and religious policy practice of the MSZMP, without regressing to the positions of social and political spontaneity, broke up the frameworks of the idea of religion which had developed and spread in the period of dogmatism, which had proved both too narrow and too broad in the new situation. The practice of our party demanded ever more urgently a revival of Marxist research and literary activity which analyzed religion.

This demand found a response among researchers who identified with the policy of the MSZMP. And if today we look back on the religious criticism

and religious theory activity of the past 15 years then we can say that this revival, which is proven by results set down in scientific works, was not produced by some "autonomous" development of scientific research. It can be easily seen in a substantive analysis of the works of our domestic authors that while there has been a quantitative growth of our religious criticism and religious theory literature the direction of it has been primarily a child of and an organic part of the practice of our socialist society.

VILAGOSSAG has played a pioneering role in this work, has won recognition for its content significant even today, serving the goals of our party, and is one of the "first born" in this process.

At the time of its initiation many were skeptical about the future of a domestic atheist journal for we did not have much of a tradition in this area. In our homeland, if there were those who dealt in various areas with the problems of religious history and the theory of atheism, there was no institution which combined them into an organized collective for the solution of the theoretical and practical-propagandistic tasks of the materialist-atheist world-view.

VILAGOSSAG is a well read and popular journal and I think that the reason for this is that from the beginning its editors were able to break unambiguously with the spirit of the sectarian period which regarded religion only as a distorted, false explanation of the world intended to defend reactionary class interests and, as a result, treated believers as suspected of participation in the ranks of the political enemies of socialism. At the same time, the basic conception of the journal did not return to the position of the "enlightenment" either, a position which explains religion simply as a phenomenon of consciousness deriving from ignorance and thus expects it to be abolished as a result of a fuller mastering of culture. In addition, the existence and activity of the journal were in themselves signs that ideas can be overcome only with other, more developed ideas on the basis of our socialist development.

The journal as a whole reflects faithfulness to the Marxist conception of religion. Its calm and tranquil tone derives from this; it does not offend and it avoids hunting for cheap effects even in its propagandistic writings.

As a result of the achievements of the practical policy of the party and as a result of urgent needs research aimed at cultivation of the general religious theory of Marxism has begun, if a little late and unevenly, and has brought results which promise a significant development in the future if certain conditions continue to exist.

When speaking of the general religious theory of Marxism we must note that while we cannot speak of a systematically worked out and definite religious theory it is the task of the future to work out just such a theory; Marxism,

as a uniform system of ideas, contains, through the totality of its world picture, the starting and end points of a general theory about religion and the tools and methods for working out such a theory. There is no independent religious theory, but one can be cultivated effectively as part of Marxist philosophy as a whole, founded before all else in its concept of society and inseparable from it. And this is simply because religion is not something which can be made independent of the unified whole of society and the life of man.

The Marxist turning point in the history of atheism results before all else from the view according to which Marx does not recognize an independent existence for religion which can be separated from society and human life as a whole. Society and the world of human life are a uniform whole. What religion is and what role it plays in the life of society can be discovered only in the totality of the conditions of life.

Thus, when working out a religious theory the object of research must be the totality of the conditions of life.

I consider one of the most important achievements of the past 6-7 years to be that it has been possible to fix the difference between the religious conception of Marxism and the concept of atheism before Marx, just that which the period of dogmatism obscured simply because it tended to regress to the concept of the enlightenment which was the most essential aspect of atheism before Marx.

Religion is a necessarily appearing form under definite conditions of social regulation which, as a result, is not merely a false explanation of the world which can be dispersed simply by acquiring knowledge.

It must be noted that for the time being we do not see this principle being realized consistently in all writing; a certain eclecticism is sometimes found in which are mixed elements of enlightenment and a conception which can be regarded as truly Marxist. It is true what Jozsef Lukacs wrote in his above-cited article: "The results are not entirely in proportion to the objective possibilities or to the subjective efforts...." (p 206)

I consider the most important task to be the application of the Marxist-Leninist principles of religious theory to the conditions of socialism and the development of substantive concrete elements thereof which can be achieved by this means. It is perhaps here that we are most backward although the chief task of general religious theory research should be an examination of the relation of socialism and religion and the discovery of the essential conditions for the ending of religion and the ideals sticking to concrete reality which are capable of changing it.

This can be offered only by a concrete analysis of the concrete situation and by an examination of the practice and life circumstances of our

socialist development. At this point the further development of a general religious theory becomes a function of research in other directions lacking which possible attempts at religious theory research are forced into speculative theorizing.

Religious theory research applicable to our present reality cannot be carried further without research in religious sociology, religious psychology, ethics, ethnography and pedagogy and an examination of the renewal of contemporary religion and religiosity and of trends of activity in socialism affecting man. It is just here that the lack is the greatest.

Thus complex research is needed for the further cultivation of general religious theory especially if it is to serve the practice of our day.

If we examine the relation of socialism and religion with the methodological tools used by Marx then we cannot forget what Marx himself noted about the period of the transition from capitalism to communism, what Lenin calls "socialism" in "State and Revolution."

Socialism, as the transitional society, is not yet the world of liberated human life, not the "realm of freedom," but rather a human world being liberated and thus contains the possibility of a need for religious supplementation. But the contrary is also true, and to an increasing degree.

The ending of religion coincides with a process in the course of which individuals form their lives as their own, a process of the creation and spread of human relations in which liberated human contacts come into being. This makes possible a rational and self-fulfilling life, a completeness of life which requires no supplementation.

Thus the man seeking himself cannot be led to the path on which he will find himself by the methods of the old religious arguments.

The man seeking himself in religion must be made an active participant in the socialist society and if he can carry out activity in the work of building socialism in which he can fulfill himself, which he may undertake with religious motives, sooner or later this activity itself, in which his creative energies can be freely employed, will cause him to forget religion.

The elimination of religion is before all else a practical question. This was the position of the classics of Marxism. A life without religion comes into being as a result of social relations which make possible a rational, fulfilled life. And creating this takes place in the practice of class struggle which, naturally, cannot be without world-view struggle today either.

But this is not a struggle against some abstract religiosity. Correctly conceived world-view struggle requires that we discover the actual social role of religion (which is always defined by historical concreteness), not

only its negative character (for even in its negativity it is necessary and unavoidable) in "pre-history," and that we argue with every ideal, including religious ideals, which conceives as impossible a struggle with the tools of this world for the liberation of man. At the same time we must offer a helping hand to every attempt which, though it starts from a religious motive, wants to be in the world, in our socialist world and which makes it possible for an active person to develop his energies and lead a life which has no need for transcendent supplementation.

In this process, and thus in a man carrying out practical activity, the only effective atheist ideological system of our day is Marxism, without which there is no true absence of religion.

Catholicism and Socialism

Budapest VILAGOSSAG in Hungarian No 1, Jan 77 Supplement pp 32-39

[Article by Gusztav Gecse]

[Text] On the 30th anniversary of the liberation of our homeland the Hungarian Catholic Bench of Bishops issued a circular letter (Budapest, 11 March 1975) in which we can read the following: "Together with the people the church has found a new place in the socialist society and together with the people it assumes a full community of fate in the future." A year later, in February 1976, after being named Archbishop of Esztergom, Laszlo Lekai made this statement to the Hungarian Telegraph Office: "As Primate and Archbishop of Esztergom I consider it my mission to stand on the soil of realities; I will not try to turn back the process of development but rather will aid it. The truth is that we live together, believers and non-believers, in the socialist society. All of us want to prosper here and we will strive with our own physical and intellectual work to develop to an even higher level this well being and this life worthy of a man."

Before all else these statements show that despite an implacable world-view opposition socialism and Christianity, Catholicism, fit well together in our homeland in the areas of everyday life, practical activity and construction. They also show that believing Catholics can identify with goals interdependent with the building of socialism and can commit themselves to the cause of socialism--which is also proven by everyday experience.

We should add that on the basis of principled considerations the socialist state also requires the activity of religious workers interested in social progress and the creation of socialism. In his congress report Janos Kadar said: "In the period of the building of the developed socialist society the continuation of our alliance policy, uniting all creative forces of the nation and a further expansion of socialist national unity become even more important."

There can be no doubt (starting from the common interest already mentioned) that cooperation can be imagined on the basis of and, indeed, is necessary for the principled foundations of Marxism. (Marxism-Leninism, the ideological foundation of socialism, is a materialist and thus an atheist ideology. But it does not follow from this that the socialist revolution, the revolution of the proletariat, is a revolution of atheism or of atheists.) The Marxist basic principle according to which our consciousness is nothing other than the consciousness of our activity, that is, that definite levels of awareness correspond to certain forms of activity, should on the one hand dispel our world-view misgivings--for a man active in the socialist manner is on the best road toward the development of socialist awareness--but on the other hand it should inspire unceasing ideological struggle so that the level of awareness lagging behind the form of activity should be raised to a higher level.

There is a question, however, whether a Christian Catholic man can truly commit himself to socialism. Do not unresolvable contradictions hide in the concept of a "double commitment"? It is self-evident that commitment has a social-political character and does not affect the antagonistic ideological contradiction. Thus the Catholic man simultaneously says yes to the socialism which has a materialist-atheist world-view foundation and to a theist Christianity or Catholicism.

From Anathema to Cooperation

It cannot be said that the Catholic Church was always insensitive to the problems of society or that church people never dealt with social questions. Nor can it be said that religious or church statements and positions exclusively defended exploitation, served the interests of oppressing classes and played a retrograde social role. We can think here of the condemnations of the rich in the Book of Revelations, of the social-ethical passages of the Gospels, of the social positions of the Epistles of Paul, or of the social theory statements of the Church Fathers, of the views expressed about the scholastic justice and common good and many others.

But at the same time it is a fact that the so-called Church of Constantine claimed divine origin, made holy the existing order and thus excessively committed itself to the class society, the ruling class, primarily the ruling class of feudalism. In close interdependence with this it put in the foreground ideals which had as their chief virtue humility, resignation, obedience and defense of existing conditions, the true goals of which ideals need not be realized in this world.

In the second half of the last century this Constantine view took a unique form and became a complete and rigid rejection of all forms of progress. In the Syllabus of Pope Pius IX (1846-1878), in the modern collection of errors, everything which was born on the soil of the French revolution was condemned in 80 points. The protest against the achievements of the French revolution--which actually expressed the stubborn opposition of the

Constantine, feudal Church against capitalism and bourgeois democracy-- was coupled with ridiculous obscurantism. For example, Pope Pius IX would not permit the use of gas lighting in the Church state even though Louis Veuillot, the French Catholic publicist (well before its rejection by Pius) justified the superiority of gas lighting when he wrote that a single gas lamp which was capable of driving away a thief was nothing other than the light of faith illuminating souls.

It is natural that this profoundly anti-progressive position of Rome which pronounced anathema on everything which was not Catholic (according to the thinking of the Constantine Church) and which shut itself off from everything which was progressive (in 1870 Pius IX physically shut himself up in the walls of the Vatican) was accompanied by the most complete insensitivity toward social questions. P. Hyacinthe, the preacher of Notre Dame in Paris, had to leave the Church after the First Vatican Council (1870) because he showed himself open to the questions of his age and because he dared to say that man was capable of doing something in this life. So it is no wonder that the curses of the Church did not spare the increasingly developing social movements. The Syllabus lists the earlier encyclicals of Pius IX which condemned socialism and communism as the bearers of the most monstrous and most dangerous errors.

Thus, with the Syllabus, an age began in the Church when the Catholic Christian could not approve of progress, much less be a believer in socialism. Jean-Francois Six, responsible officer of the French office of the Secretariat of Non-Believers, called the day on which the Syllabus was published (8 December 1864) the darkest day in the history of the Church, when the dialog between the Church and the world reached a nadir.

The encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903) beginning *Immortale Dei* (1885) and *Libertas* (1888) went beyond the anti-bourgeois state position of the Syllabus and described the behavior considered correct in regard to the divine Church and the equally divine (bourgeois) state. Two things followed necessarily from this. First, that the Church, making its peace with capitalism and allying itself with it, could not reject the scientific achievements which capitalism needed. "The Church supports with joy everything which enriches science and truly carries it forward, indeed...it encourages the natural sciences" we can read in the encyclical beginning *Immortale Dei*. As we know, the Pope entrusted to Neo-Thomism a harmonization of the traditional articles of faith and the modern scientific achievements. In the second place it turned very sharply against socialism, the greatest enemy of capitalism, not only condemning it as "a deadly plague which attacks and wastes the essence of human society" (*Quod Apostolici Muneris*, 1878) but also opposing to it the basic principles of Christian social doctrine which defended private property. (*Rerum Novarum*, 1891)

In the meanwhile many did not agree with the attempts of Neo-Thomism to harmonize faith and science and actually to subordinate science to faith

but rather radically attempted to accommodate the Church to modern culture. These modernizing attempts, Catholic modernism, were severely condemned by the encyclical of Pope Pius X (1903-1914) beginning *Pascendi* (1907) and, indeed, a new Syllabus was compiled against modernism (the *Lamentabili* decree, 1907).

The sharp anti-socialism of official Church teachings also met with criticism. The Abbe Lissorgues caused a great scandal in 1934 by publishing in the 21 March issue of *LA CROIX* an article titled "The Communists Are Our Brothers." There were a number of meetings between Catholics and communists in France during 1935 and on 17 April 1936 Maurice Thorez announced on the Paris radio the "policy of the open hand." "We offer our hand to you, Catholic worker, employee, artisan and peasant, we who are not believers, because you are our brothers and because you are oppressed by the same problems as we." The French Catholics then broke into two camps. Some felt it to be their apostolic obligation to cooperate with the communists while others condemned and refused all contact with them. From the Catholic side Jacques Maritain, Gabriel Marcel and Emmanuel Mounier contributed to a theoretical foundation for cooperation with the communists.

But just as Pius X did not permit the development of modernism so Pope Pius XI (1922-1939), with his encyclical beginning *Divini Redemptoris* (1937), which he published against communism, made cooperation with the communists impossible. The situation was not improved much by those interpretations of the encyclical according to which the ban on cooperation with the communists did not mean that every contact with them had to be broken; even the Pope could be regarded as cooperating for he had a nuncio in the Popular Front Government which the communists were supporting. At the most such interpretations made it possible to create a certain action unity between Christians and communists during Nazi rule or occupation (e.g., in France, Italy and Poland) and that Catholics could join the resistance movement and show passive or active resistance together with the communists in the concentration camps. But this could happen for a Christian Catholic man only on the basis of a decision before the individual internal forum of conscience--in spite of the external forum--and thus could result in conflicts of conscience.

The cold war atmosphere which began in 1947 and divided mankind into communists and anti-communists did not favor contacts between Catholicism and socialism. On this soil there could only be statements such as the decree against communism of the Holy Office which was issued with the approval of Pope Pius XII (1939-1958). This decree forbade Catholics to join the Communist Party or sympathize with it, to publish, read or spread products of the communist press. Those guilty of these things were forbidden the sacraments and Catholics adhering to or spreading communist teachings brought upon themselves the excommunication maintained by the Holy See. With this decree the possibility of creating contacts between Catholicism and socialism again reached a nadir, from the Catholic side. It appeared that movement from this nadir was impossible.

This circumstance made it difficult for the Catholic Church in Hungary to easily find its place in our society working on the construction of socialism and made it possible for a few years for the influence of old conservative Church leaders to be effective within the Church, leaders who had rejected even the bourgeois transformation.

But there was an ever increasing number of Catholic priests who behaved realistically, who thought the same way as the majority of believers and decided to approve of the socialist transformation. This was formulated in 1950 by the episcopal counsellor Jozsef Gergely in a sermon given at the pilgrimage of the Hungarian Holy Cross Society: "Let us not permit ourselves to be turned against the democracy of our people!... We also want to build a better present and a happier future for our working people." The statement of the National Peace Committee of Catholic Priests issued on 1 November 1950 expresses the commitment to socialism even more determinedly: "We know that what is needed now is not crumbs of social justice or drops of social oil; rather it is socialism itself which is being built now and this is the essential thing."

The realistic view finally came to rule in the Church leadership in Hungary too as a result of which there was an agreement in 1950 between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Catholic Church which regulated relations between the two in a reassuring manner and over a longer range. The cold war atmosphere and the rigidity of the Vatican, however, made an unconfused development difficult. (We might only mention here the role played by sectarian dogmatism in this connection.)

In the meantime, however, many things changed in the Catholic Church. The papacy of John XXIII (1958-1963) and the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) represented in many respects a turning point in the history of Catholicism--naturally not independent of changes in "the world" and the strengthening of the progressive and independence movements and the position and respect of socialism. It is enough to merely mention here that in 1960, 13 African countries won their independence and that on 12 April 1961 a sensational report ran around the world--man, in the person of the Soviet Gagarin, had appeared in space.

In the first encyclical of John XXIII (Ad Petri Cathedram, 1959) there shines the thought that unity is needed between the Church and the world. In this connection the Pope used a quotation from the memoirs of Augustine --"In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas" (Unity in necessary things, freedom in doubtful things, love in all things)-- indicating that what was involved was not the forced unity idea of the Constantine, triumphal view but rather cooperation expressed in the interest of the common, recognized good of men with different views. This thought is expressed even more clearly in the encyclical beginning Mater et Magistra (1961): The Catholics "must show an inclination to cooperate honorably (i.e. with those who have different world-views) in carrying out everything which is by nature good or at least leads to good." And that

in this process one must respect the opinion of the other side can be read from that passage of the encyclical beginning *Pacem In Terris* (1963), intended for all men of good will, which declares as a right of man the free search for truth and freedom of expression.

In the encyclical beginning *Ecclesiam Suam* (1964), however, Pope Paul VI made a surprising restriction in this area in that, while declaring a dialog with the world necessary, he held a dialog with atheists to be almost impossible. Inasmuch as atheism is the chief evil the dialog must be aimed at overcoming atheism. Naturally this absolutizing of world-view contradictions did no good for the cause of dialog but in addition it again made problematic the connection of Catholicism with socialism. The most contradictory program of the Secretariat of Non-Believers, set up in 1965, mitigated this rigidity in that it posted as a goal the recognition of every form of atheism and acquainting Christianity with the atheists.

The Second Vatican Council pointed beyond the possibility of a bare, theoretical dialog when, hypothesizing this dialog, it encouraged Catholics and atheists to joint action. "While the Church rejects atheism in its entirety it still teaches without any reservation that everyone, believer and non-believer alike, must contribute to the correct building of this world which serves as a common place of habitation, which is certainly impossible without a sincere and rational dialog." (*GAUDIUM ET SPES*, 21) The encyclical beginning *Populorum Progressio* (1967) teaches similarly when on the one hand it guarantees to Catholics the possibility of working for the good of mankind in organizations together with those with different world-views (39) and, on the other hand, it calls on all men to support the work of the newly established "Justitia et Pax" committee for peace and justice. "For this reason our present festive enthusiasm says to everyone throughout the world: Work together according to a common thought and with united strength so that every single person should have full-valued culture and mankind general progress." (5)

The Problems of Affirming Socialism in Catholicism

Thus, profound changes have taken place in the relations of the Church and the so-called world in the 100 years since the appearance of the *Syllabus*. In place of completely turning away from the world there is a dialog with the world, interest in the common, mundane problems of mankind and active participation in solving them. We have seen that this development was not even. And it should also be obvious to us that dialog and cooperation with atheists (Marxists) have their own thus far unsolved theoretical problems. Tamas Nyiri writes: "The mission of the Christian in the world is a question and a problem which refers to the internal polarization of our Christian being. The question is how to harmonize in our lives a guaranteeing of the earthly foundations of our existence and our eternal calling. These two tasks have always produced tension...."

So we should not wonder at the fact that there are opponents of dialog and cooperation within the Church. In the course of the debate of the theme

"The Church in the Contemporary World" at the fourth session of the Council a minority group submitted a petition to the Council requesting the condemnation of communism. The text of the petition was published by the Italian paper TEMPO on 22 October 1965 with 334 signatures. The condemnation did not take place because the great majority of the Council fathers frustrated it--as a result of a determined protest by the bishops from socialist countries. But they could not prevent the GAUDIUM ET SPES pastoral constitution from citing the encyclical of Pius XI beginning *Divini Redemptoris*, which condemns communism.

The fact that there is a certain openness in the Church to the problems of the world derives from the recognition that not only has the Church lost its monopoly position in the world but also that it is considerably isolated, has isolated itself, and that its influence on modern society has greatly decreased. If it does not want to be a "burden" on the world as an alien, hostile body--and as a result become even more isolated--and in the developing and new forming conditions to gradually disappear together with the "old world" then it must think through again its relation with the world and must seek the place and role in the modern world of Christianity, Catholicism and every believer. It must break with the harmful and morbid inheritance of its past and must become open in the direction of the future. The Second Vatican Council undertook to carry out this task and as a result there is the possibility of a dialog with the world and of action in the pluralist world of the future.

There is an increasing number, among Catholics as within Catholicism and in countries building socialism and in the capitalist world, who not only seek possibilities for cooperation in building the future but also commit themselves to the building of socialism. Those who simultaneously say yes to socialism and Catholicism and who simultaneously say no to atheism and capitalism, to the class society. Those who demand that one can be a socialist in the Christian world and a Christian in the socialist world.

Laszlo Lekai, the archbishop of Esztergom, gave expression to this in his already cited statement: "We, believing Catholics, want to respect the world-view convictions of others. But we expect them to respect ours. Especially so if they find that we, starting from a religious world-view, can approach the aspirations of a developed socialist society."

Nor are there only a few who have decided for socialism on the basis of their Christian Catholic faith despite the fact that the 1937 encyclical beginning *Divini Redemptoris*, already cited, warns believers against communism and socialism: "Take care, Reverend Brothers, that the believers do not stumble. The seed of communism is evil. In no area can one cooperate with it if we want to save Christian culture."

The increase in the number and significance of Catholics choosing socialism was indicated by a conference held in Bologna in September 1973 where some 2,000 Catholic participants from every part of the world took a determined

stand for socialism, seeking what Christians could do for socialism. It was proven by the positions taken in May 1971 by the workers' division of the ACO, the French Catholic Action organization, and in September 1971 by the Organization of Italian Catholic Universities (FUCI) which broke a lance for the class struggle view.

This aspiration is especially strong in South America where one can find believers in socialism not only among believers and the so-called lower clergy but also among members of the hierarchy (e.g., Helder Camara, archbishop of Recife and Olinda) and where we can even find priests undertaking armed struggle with the guerrillas for the cause of the revolution (e.g., the martyr Camilo Torres) and where the priests are establishing social communes (e.g., Ernesto Cardenal, the famous Nicaraguan priest-poet).

An increasing number of theoreticians and theologians are also committed to socialism. Outstanding among these is the Salesian monk Giulio Girardi.

It is quite natural that the commitment is even greater in countries building socialism, and thus among us also, and that official positions are not lacking, as we saw earlier. Unfortunately a theological foundation is still lacking. As an example here we might merely cite a statement by Richard Horvath, a vanguard fighter for the adaptation of the Catholic Church to socialism: "There is one thing about which we cannot debate, all of us are building socialism. We must agree in this.... He who does not accept this is an enemy. But socialism can be built with a religious conviction too. Believers can build it and do build it.... The truth of socialism is greater. And we must always take a stand for the greater truth. And in an awareness of this, creating a clear foundation even in principle, there can come into being, has come into being in many things and will come into being an honorable, mutually aiding, mutually enriching, profound and beautiful union of believers and non-believers in matters of life and humanity."

But the commitment of Catholics to socialism is not free of problems. The Vatican has created, together with certain reservations, the possibility for dialog and cooperation but it is not clear whether the possibility of adopting socialism hides in this possibility. We might cite in this connection the apostolic letter beginning Octogesima Adveniens which Pope Paul VI sent on 14 May 1971 to the French cardinal Maurice Roy on the 80th anniversary of the publication of Rerum Novarum. This letter reacts sharply to the social problems of the age and encourages Christians to active participation in their solution. But it also criticizes Marxism at length, viewing with alarm the attraction of socialist trends and thus makes very problematical the statements it makes in connection with the pluralism of decisions but which it only proclaims. "In concrete situations, taking into consideration the solidarity which we all have experienced, we must recognize that we are opposed to many of the possible choices and decisions. The same thing can lead to differing commitments of the Christian faith."

Even if we cannot agree with the evaluation of Alceste Santini, according to whom the "Octogesima Adveniens legitimized the complete freedom of the political decisions of Catholics, including the election of socialists," it is nevertheless a fact that the short passage quoted has extraordinarily great significance. Taking into consideration the textual interdependencies, burdened with many reservations and contradictions, it does not in the final analysis rule out the possibility that the Catholics can choose socialism. But they can do this, and this is natural, only if they do not adopt its Marxist-atheist ideology and if their decision is in harmony with the scriptures.

In this way the Octogesima Adveniens gave greater courage to Christians choosing socialism but it also encouraged those choosing socialism to seek a theological and biblical foundation for their decision.

In the course of building socialism in countries building socialism identification with the aspirations of socialism presents fewer problems. It would appear that aspirations aimed at a full-valued realization of man can be brought into harmony with the demands of Christian humanism. According to Girardi it is a false alternative, which nevertheless lives in the awareness of Christian Catholics, that believers must choose between man and God. And if one chooses man one must deny God and vice versa. There can be no doubt, Girardi says, that Christianity is before all else a religion, a sort of relation between man and God, in which one must recognize the supremacy of God without reservations. And it is also true that salvation is nothing other than the approach of mankind toward an ever more internal union with God. But in the center of this unity aspiration man meets with a Man who undertakes to be God, a Man so closely linked with God that He is himself divine as well as being the most perfect realization of mankind.

In this way, according to Girardi, Christianity actually announces the self-realization of man and aids the process of salvation and so the humanist program of Marxism, of socialism, cannot be alien to it. But for this there must be a transformation of that concept of God according to which God is the absolute lord of the world and every other reality, including man, must serve the glory of God. That concept of God according to which God is some kind of tyrant who saves for his glory those whom He wants to and damns those whom He wants to. Because according to this concept it is true that he who chooses God must necessarily sacrifice man and he who chooses man must necessarily sacrifice God.

We must note here that the reformulation and re-interpretation of the most abstract dogmas is not merely an "internal theological matter" for they often express new social content and thus go beyond the narrower theological environment. Just as the birth of the dogmas was not independent of processes taking place deep in society (we might think here of the birth and development of the dogma of predestination) so their transformation, modification and new interpretation also have social content and

inspiration. For this very reason it cannot be a matter of indifference to a Marxist to examine theology and study the birth, development and modification of dogmas.

We have said that after the victory of the socialist revolution and in the period of the building of socialism affirmation of socialism is less problematical (although not completely without problems) for Catholics, on the basis of a re-evaluation of Christian anthropology and theology (concepts of God) in harmony with the Catholic system of dogmas. At the same time greater difficulties appear in the capitalist world in connection with positions taken by Catholics who undertake to be socialists and revolutionaries. This is not only because Catholics who side with socialism and reject the capitalist society and demand revolutionary progress are considered to be quarrelsome critics and hostile elements (this charge can be easily rejected or in a certain sense admitted) but it is much more because the purity of their Christian Catholic faith is brought into doubt and their activity is viewed with suspicion. Their class struggle view and revolutionary position, especially, are considered un-Christian and incompatible with the commandment of love. Christianity is an assumption of love and he who violates this love in a permanent manner and assumes views consciously opposed to it cannot be, they say, a true Christian.

As for class struggle, the fundamental contradiction derives from the fact that the gospel is a gospel of love. According to Jesus' program announced in the Sermon on the Mount if one strikes you on the right cheek you must turn to him the other cheek also and if someone forces you to go a thousand paces with him you must go with him two thousand. One must love one's enemies, do good to those angry with you and pray for those who persecute you. Can one say that that Catholic is being faithful to Christ who fights against those who oppress him? But another dilemma also arises on the basis of gospel thinking: Should the Christian acquiesce in injustice--and in this case be similar to the priest and the Levite of the gospel who, according to the parable about the compassionate Samaritan, passed without feeling the man robbed and beaten half to death by robbers without trying to help him--or should he fight against injustice--and in this case be similar to Peter who wanted to defend Jesus with force from those who took him and whom Jesus told to be peaceful. "On the one hand love is lacking and one shares in the guilt of injustice but on the other hand patience is lacking, and perhaps love also." Thus is the dilemma formulated by Alfred Ancel, until 1973 assistant bishop of Lyon and vicar of the French workers' mission and pastorate of foreigners. Ancel considered this dilemma to be resolvable only if it was handled in a non-exclusive way from both sides. "In the present case love for God and for our brothers obliges us to struggle against oppression, in the interest of liberation and for collective progress but this same love also obliges us to fundamentally modify our activity. We should always be guided by love and the spirit of Christ."

How can love be realized in regard to the class enemy? Ancel sees the only possibility for this if the struggle is against the unjust structure,

against oppression, and not against persons. The goal of the liberation process is not to bring others to account for their sins but rather to put an end to unjust relationships.

It is also interesting to note how Ancel sees the role of religion in the class struggle. By calling attention to the fact that bourgeois law is not the highest norm for action but rather conscience, religion makes possible in a certain sense and even necessarily proclaims so-called illegal action against existing laws. It thus liberates the oppressed from fear and from despair and from giving up their rights and encourages them to joint action and nourishes their hopes for liberation. Faith keeps alive the awareness that the believer is responsible before God (and before men) for the ordering of society. It encourages a search and action because according to faith God did not want to provide ready solutions in regard to social structures but rather gave man the necessary understanding and strength to recognize and realize better solutions.

The problem of revolution or revolutionary violence perhaps carries more difficulties for the Christian Catholic than does class struggle. Like class struggle it also conflicts with the commandment of love. The question is how far a Christian can go in building the future, the new world, where every man can realize himself, his best abilities and his most profound inspirations. Thus is the question posed by Girardi in his work titled "Christian Love and Revolutionary Violence."

The foundation for the new world is freedom, independence from every natural and social subordination. Only thus can man be the former of history, developer of his life and creator of his culture. In the new world man will be the goal, executor and norm of action. But the condition for this freedom affecting individual men must be general freedom, the freedom of every man. No one can be completely free if freedom does not extend to all. Thus freedom is inseparable from love. Thus in the society of the future the possibility of war and of every form of violence will be eliminated.

The question is what can be the role of the Christian in the realization of this new world (of socialism or communism). Does not the "mundane" idea and aspiration conflict with the transmundane hopes of the Christian? Must the Christian mature through internal transformation and the salvation of his soul and must he give up a history forming role in his thinking? Or should the commandment of love be so interpreted by Christians in our day as to be inseparable from revolution? Girardi says that today the commandment of love means that the world must be radically transformed and made into a world where men live freely and free of all alienation.

It seems at first glance, however, that the Bible does not provide a solution in regard to revolutionary violence. The New Testament makes the situation especially difficult when Jesus offers himself as a sacrificial lamb to the power. But this does not at all mean that Catholicism must

reject without thought revolutionary violence as something alien to Christianity. The problem has appeared in history that man must choose between violence and non-violence (in this case there can be no doubt for the Christian that he must choose non-violence) but the real problem is that man must choose between two forms of violence, the violence of the oppressors and the violence of the oppressed. It is not a choice between good and evil but between two evils. It is natural that in this situation the place of the Catholic is on the side of revolutionary violence. He is aided in his decision by the encyclical beginning *Populorum Progressio* (Paul VI, 1967) which considers revolutionary violence possible in the event of "obvious and long lasting tyranny."

According to Girardi this revolution must be fought to the end by believers and non-believers together despite the fact that profound contradictions can be found among them in regard to the future, because believers are not satisfied with mundane goals. But the prospect of eternal life, which faith offers to them, cannot mean that they should not fight without reservations for the reconstruction of mundane society.

Perhaps this sketchy review makes clear how certain circles of the Catholic Church have reached the point where, even if with serious reservations, it has become possible for Catholics to say yes to socialism within certain frameworks. Perhaps it has also made clear that as a result of worldwide social movements and changes--independent of the positions taken by the hierarchy--the camp of Catholics who consciously support socialism, with religious motives, is ever growing.

In this connection many tasks await Marxist socialists. They must seek points of meeting but they must also clearly define the lines of separation. They must further examine the prospects for the future in international relationships and amidst our domestic relations as well. But this will require prolonged analytical work and it presupposes an evaluation of the experiences of practical cooperation. This cannot be the task of this study for it goes far beyond its frameworks and possibilities.

Calvinism in Socialism

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[Article by Istvan Konya: "The Practice of Calvinism in Socialism"]

[Text] After the liberation there began in our homeland a profound social transformation as a result of which the Hungarian people, under the leadership of the worker class, carried out a socialist revolution, with a transforming effect on every sphere of social awareness.

In those forms of awareness where the bourgeois ideology and the scientific world-view of the worker class conflict in a direct manner (politics, law, morality, even philosophy and to a certain degree art and the social

sciences) these changes were in the direction of the hegemony of socialist awareness, gradually forcing out the remnants of the bourgeois ideology.

The situation is unique in the case of religious awareness. In principle religious awareness cannot have an historic version which "adequately corresponds" to the other forms of socialist awareness. Socialist politics, law, morality, etc. do exist but there is no socialist religion. But since religion is a part of social awareness (it is not only that but from the viewpoint of our theme it is only this side which now interests us) the changes taking place in social relationships have an effect on religious awareness also and are reflected in the fact that transformations are taking place which further deepen the general crisis of religion.

Within certain limits these transformations make the religious views still living among us suitable for their followers, according to the internal logic of their world of faith, to become sincere supporters of the building of socialism, feeling that this society is not only "compatible" with the teachings of their religion but also that it can "follow from" these teachings. And since the objective interests of the religious working strata really do coincide with the goals of socialism they must carry out "corrections" in their religious ideology so that it does not frustrate but even in a certain sense ideologically aids the practical realization of these interests.

I feel that the development of Reformed Church theology in Hungary since the liberation provides a very tangible example of this ideological phenomenon.

The theoretical theology, political ideology and practical activity of the Hungarian Reformed Church prior to the liberation was of such a character that with its aid the Church fit organically into the reactionary political-ideological system of the Horthy regime.

Within a few years after the liberation, however, the Church went through such a swift transformation that the people's democratic state, on the basis of a realization of the church policy principles of Marxism-Leninism, was able relatively quickly to conclude with it an agreement regulating the conditions of its operation. Since this time the Hungarian Reformed Church and the socialist state, despite the world-view antagonism existing between them, have realized normal cooperation in many essential questions of social life.

If we are to achieve a review of Calvinist practice in our day we must at least sketchily summarize the path followed since the liberation.

We must note in advance that in these three decades Hungarian Reformed Church theology, and the Church policy based on it, has produced a theological-theoretical development the significance of which goes beyond the frameworks of the Hungarian church and in a certain sense provides an

example for other Protestant churches operating in socialist countries and even has a demonstrable effect on the theological development of non-Protestant churches.

To speak most generally, the chief characteristic of the so-called "theology of the servant church" developed by the Hungarian Reformed Church consists of the fact that the social doctrine of the church comes to the surface in its theological teachings.

This was always true in the history of theology when theology had to adjust to significant social transformations. So it is understandable that when theology had to adjust (or at least had to try to adjust!) to a social transformation of greater magnitude than ever before the forefront of theological interest was not occupied by abstract dogmatic theses but rather by theological answers to questions posed by social relations in a process of revolutionary transformation.

I. The Road of the Hungarian Reformed Church From the Liberation to the Year of the Turning

Hungarian Calvinist theology in the 19th and 20th centuries had an extraordinarily mixed profile. It was affected by all those trends which came into being and followed one another in Western European Protestant theology, indicating by their mere existence the development of the general crisis of religion.

The mixture of the many Western theological trends made of Hungarian Reformed Church theology a most odd theological amalgam. And this mixed theology with its own provincialism became a suitable tool for the ideological support of Horthy fascism. And with the aid of extraordinarily purposive strategic principles this "mixed theology" was put into the service of the chief political line of the counterrevolutionary system (the Horthy-Bethlen line) by the powerful leader of the Hungarian Reformed Church between the two world wars, Bishop Laszlo Ravasz.

The gradual influx into the theological life of the Hungarian Reformed Church of the so-called "dialectical theology" started by Karl Barth began to break up this theological profile in the 1930's. The appearance and spread of Barthianism in Hungarian Reformed Church theology was significant because on the basis of this trend there developed those Calvinist theological groups which, in the 1930's largely on the theoretical theology level but during World War II on the practical political level, in the case of some groups and some representatives of them, gradually came to oppose the official church leadership represented by Ravasz. The Barthian trend thus established, primarily in provincial (Sarospatak, Debrecen, Papa and later Kolozsvar) theology, created small "opposition" theology groups which, in the period following the liberation, were to form the nucleus of a new church leadership taking the politically democratic road.

Although the act of the liberation and our first steps on the road of popular democratic development did not cause a radical change in the Hungarian Reformed Church, for the church leadership of the Horthy period--with Bishop Laszlo Ravasz at the head--remained in place, a political and theological critical examination of the counterrevolutionary period began in the church in 1945 and as a result of this internal struggles within the church sharpened. Up to the year of the turning, however, the chief line among the church leadership was that of Ravasz.

This line was opposed by a group of churchmen who thought in a democratic way, who were sympathetic to a line of social progress going toward socialism and who were able to gradually spread their influence within the church and who represented politically a new alternative for the Hungarian Reformed Church.

It was not only the political views of this group--the outstanding personality of which was the Budapest pastor Albert Bereczky--which differed sharply from the policies of the Ravasz supreme leadership but also their theological starting point.

At the time of the liberation there were two possibilities, two roads before the Hungarian Reformed Church in regard to politics, church policy and, in the final analysis, theology.

One possibility was to continue the policies the church had followed between the two world wars, assuming the risk that on this road the church would sooner or later come to oppose the popular democratic development. The Ravasz type church leadership tried this road.

The other possibility was to critically re-examine the past and in the most essential social questions to adjust the actions of the church to the progress of the people who were taking their own fate into their hands. The Bereczky type trend sought this road.

The fundamental aspirations of the two church forces choosing the two possibilities are well expressed by those statements which their leaders made about the character of the social transformation which began with the liberation in 1945.

Laszlo Ravasz spoke thus in 1945: "The church imagines a policy which... attempts to smooth the break of the revolution into a stage of evolution...."

Albert Bereczky, on the other hand, expressed himself thus: "We have gone through and we are going through a social revolution of extraordinary dimensions.... There can be no doubt that the terrible neglects of the past made this revolutionary transformation unavoidable.... People who saw clearly demanded in vain only the one must urgent measure, land reform, when that could have been done amidst tranquil economic conditions taking carefully into consideration all national interests. There

was a time for evolution. Those who let this time pass should not bemoan the fact that the revolution will now make up for their neglect."

In 1946 Bereczky very precisely formulated the two possible roads for the church: "God has judged our past; and so the present is as it is. This present can be accepted in two ways only: With open or secret rebellion, in which case the judgment of God will continue and increase, or with humble acquiescence, in which case God may grant, if it so pleases Him, a merciful future."

It is completely clear that Bereczky considered the second road the only permissible one for the church.

The Reformed Church theologians later called the entry onto this road the "orienting" of the church. It is today completely clear that this "orientation" led to the creation of the new Calvinist theological idea.

In the period immediately following the liberation, partly motivated by the Barthian theology and partly striving for "orientation" in a society progressing toward socialism, there came into being, with the aid of the theological work of Hungarian Reformed Church theologians, a theological conception the birth and development of which can be followed with precision.

One of the earliest and most striking examples of this was an article by Bereczky which appeared in 1946 with the title "What Is Most Important." It is worthwhile to examine this in a little more detail.

The basic point of the article is that what is most important is to enter the country of God. "Jesus Christ opened a narrow gate, but still a gate, the gate of forgiveness. Only one obstacle could have held us back from entering this country, sin.... He removed this obstacle. Those whom He has chosen...he has washed with his blood, he washes them clean and makes them suitable to become citizens of this entirely different country."

Up to this point this train of thought is based on the classic dogmatic principles of Calvinism. With the Barthian Christocentric "correction" that the selection of predestination is made here not by the Father but by his Son, Jesus Christ.

But the further "correction" is very essential. The original Calvinist predestination dogma applied the sphere of "special grace" exclusively to salvation or damnation in the next world. Bereczky, however, in a typically Barthian manner, continues his train of thought thus: "Those called and admitted to the country of God will remain for a few years or decades on this earth and God has a purpose which He wants to accomplish, He wants to show in this world His future country in lives dedicated to Him. To enter the gate is the crucial thing, but then the strait way follows. This way has a law--not of ourselves or for ourselves but body and soul, life and

death for His glory.... Certainly this is a hard and strait way, and all those will shy away from it who have not received upon entering it that perfectly satisfying equipment with which God clothes his own." Here we have the entire concept reservoir of the Bereczky theology, at least in its initial form. What is "new" in this theology is not that every element of it has a Biblical foundation.

- a. The teaching of the "narrow gate" is a Biblical element. This is the gate of the forgiveness of sins which was opened for those predestined for it by the ransom death of Jesus. As we have seen, the concept is built on the Calvinist predestination theory, with the Barthian correction.
- b. The "new" theological element is that those chosen must live here on earth lives which show the glory of God. Thus "being chosen" has significance not only in salvation in the next world but also in life in this world.
- c. Those who pass through the "narrow gate" of election must necessarily travel the "strait way" in their earthly life.

But Bereczky does not intend all this as some sort of abstract theologizing but rather as a practical guide to be followed in the "orientation" of the Reformed Church after the liberation.

For this reason he continues his article thus: "Now let us say all this plainly. Nothing else in the round world will help the fate of Hungary; the only thing that will help is for the believers to wake from their blindness. (Blindness is sin!) If they see that this created Hungarian world awaits with yearning the appearance of the Son of God and if they dare to assume the full Hungarian fate as it is today. In the first place, then, they should accept the judgment of God and should accept that what has happened and what is happening with us can only come from God's hand and by the direct will of God. Their humility and acquiescence derive from this. Inasmuch as they have turned to faith so now it gives them a new commandment, to turn to obedience."

Thus the theology of the "strait way" was a practical--we might well say political--guide for the Hungarian Reformed Church in 1946.

So we should see that the Bereczky "orientation" by using the Barthian correction created a new theological conception which became suitable in the hands of its users for leading the Hungarian Reformed Church--in a hard struggle with the retrograde church forces which wanted to travel the other road--toward an agreement with the popular democratic state and that after the year of the turning this theological conception was further developed as the "theology of the servant church."

Thus the theology of the "strait way" became within the church the ideological guide of the militant progressive forces with the aid of which the

influence of the Bereczky trend quickly increased in the Reformed Church. Naturally a fundamental factor in its gradual dominance was the revolutionary change taking place in the political arena and in the area of production relationships, the socialist turning. But contributing to this also was the fact that while the camp of the conservative--and ever more clearly counterrevolutionary--supreme church leadership was increasingly weakened and disorganized, the Bereczky trend aspiring to cooperation with the democratic transformation was becoming more united, better organized and more influential theoretically, organizationally and tactically.

Thus the conditions ripened so that in the spring of 1948 Laszlo Ravasz resigned and Albert Bereczky followed him in the chair of the Budapest bishop and in the leading posts of the Hungarian Reformed Church.

Then, still in 1948, the radically reorganized supreme church leadership signed an agreement with the government of the people's democratic state governing relations between state and church.

A few years later, in 1951, Bereczky precisely summed up the political and social significance of the church's decision. He said in a lecture that in the matter of socialism "...we said with a decision of faith and with a brave risk of faith, not now but several years ago, that a just, merciful and continuing judgment of God was taking place here and had taken place here.... This means that we have accepted as just that an entire social, economic and political system, a system of human communion, should come under judgment and liquidation in a history so often formed by the bloody hand of God, who governs world history also, and that in its place a new is being created by revolutionary forces. In its essence, we have said yes to this new system, to socialism. We should have said it sooner and we all should have said it...."

II. Working Out the Strategic Line of the New Reformed Church Leadership

Saying yes to socialism developed from the side of the Reformed Church in a complex internal struggle. The church leaders tried to weigh the past and the situation of the church critically. They established in a self-critical manner that "Instead of church life radiating forces into the world which would have formed the life of the world church life itself became 'secularized.' Thus it has become a burning theological question to clarify in a normative manner the relations of the church and the world on the basis of the Word so that, measuring our past by this standard, we can bow beneath the judgment given as a just judgment."

In this statement by Janos Victor there is an extraordinarily important emphasis on the fact that "it has become a burning theological question to clarify in a normative manner the relations of the church and the world on the basis of the Word." It is characteristic of the new theological conception being developed that attention was not concentrated on a "new" working out of abstract dogmatic questions but rather that there was an

attempt to clarify theologically (on the "basis of the Word" and in a "normative manner") relations of the church and the world.

In this way the church leadership was able to make its peace with the problem of the separation of state and church.

From the viewpoint of the church one of the most painful points of the separation of state and church was the nationalization of the schools. The new church leadership was able to find for itself theologically a resting point in this question in that they tried to liberate forces in this manner for their own tasks.

Janos Victor put it this way: "For generations the matter of church and school seemed inseparable.... Now we must see that this interweaving of church and school was nothing other than a phenomenon of a certain cultural epoch and, that epoch having come to an end, we must liquidate the old system of church schools.... Now our church can devote itself exclusively to that service which on the basis of the Word is its concern and entirely its concern."

It is worth noting that the position represented by Victor prompted the church to turn inward to a certain extent. That is, Victor wanted to encourage the "mission activity" of the church.

The theological practice represented by Bereczky did not realize this form of a turning inward by the church. On the contrary, Bereczky was striving to stimulate the church to active work in the world.

This attempt became especially tangible when Bereczky responded in a theoretical article to the 1 June 1950 resolution of the MDP Central Leadership pertaining to the struggle against clerical reaction. This reaction was actually a program-like expression of the theology of the "strait way" and it gave a theoretical answer to the question of why and how the Reformed Church said yes to socialism. "If there lives in the church a sincere and profound repentance for its condemned past and if there lives in the church a sincere and profound thanksgiving for the fact that the Lord God who forms history not only did not break up the frameworks of our church but is ready to fill those frameworks with the strength of the gospel so that we can serve our people then it cannot be blind to that gigantic transformation of the world in which we live and in which we must serve. So let it open its eyes and its heart to that new world forming force which is called socialism and let it say yes to the justice of socialism."

What did this affirmation mean and what did it not mean? "Does this mean that from now on we must say yes to absolutely everything that happens?... My answer clearly is that I do not say yes to everything which is happening and no one is asking this of me.... Nor do I put the emphasis on this now.... I do not now put the emphasis on criticism or on differentiation

from the world because the danger to our faith does not come from this side." That is, Bereczky clearly states that the people's democratic state guarantees in full measure freedom of religion.

Does Bereczky also examine why the church must say yes to socialism?

"We can answer simply that it must because we are in this world and this is the world of socialism. Socialism for us is not a problem but a fact.... But 'reality is one thing and justice is another.' Certainly. And this new world in which it is given us to live, a world in the throes and agonies of birth, bears in its womb the truth which is justice. It is a great judgment on us, on the church, that we lost our credibility before the world seeking a future, that the world did not believe that God fearing men desire and want to serve with all their strength in all good attempts that just and humane order to which the world aspires. If the world thinks this of us then in our own way and in our own area, with humble adherence to and assuming of our faith, we can carry out our earthly service so that strength and sacrifice should derive from it for our people and our world."

Unfortunately this position is two-edged. While it judges socialism to be a "world of justice" it states that Christianity has "lost its credibility" in the eyes of this world. Thus it encourages the members of the church to try to regain this credibility with their work, to try to convince the world that if it grants this credibility to the church then the church can perform useful service for the people and the world.

Bereczky debates with those--obviously within the church--who oppose the development of trust between the church and the "world." "Let us not seek here any loophole or escape for ourselves. Let no one among us say that here there are 'world-view differences' which 'nevertheless' make our service impossible because our partner will not trust us 'anyway.' The 'nevertheless' and the 'anyway' are Godless talk. It is not our affair how our partner reacts if the church evidences unambiguously positive behavior toward the new Hungarian state building socialism.... To recognize radically new tasks in the new situation and to seriously assume the service awaiting us--this was and remains the strait way of the church."

Thus the position is built on the theology of the "strait way" and the developing theological idea of the "servant church." It notes in a very differentiated fashion the world-view differences between the church and the socialist society but it does not regard these as obstacles in the path of possible cooperation in essential social questions. The crucial thing, it emphasizes, is that the church "evidence unambiguously positive behavior" toward the society building socialism. In this event, despite the world-view differences, cooperation is possible, especially in the question of building socialism and in the question of peace which, as an external proof, makes this possible. "In every area we must turn great attention to making our church life and our service unmistakable. Naturally

we are not and will not be servants of any other in regard to our faith for the church is the Lord's, but it is also natural that with the obedience which derives from our faith we desire and are capable of working with those who serve the cause of peace which insures a just social order based on work and insures fruitful work."

Thus Bereczky here lists together with the theological principles of the "strait way" and "service" the demand for "faithful obedience" and thus completes the theological foundation of his position.

Thus the work analyzed formulates in essence a theologically founded political-strategic program for the Reformed Church. Just as the title of the work demanded, "The Way of Our Church."

The Hungarian Reformed Church continued its political, practical activity on the basis of the strategic line thus worked out.

One of the most important areas of this activity amidst the cold war conditions was active and effective participation in the peace movement.

In close interdependence with this in the first half of the 1950's was the large scale and, from the political viewpoint, very positive ecumenical activity in which the leadership of the Hungarian Reformed Church became one of the most outstanding figures even on an international scale; even in our day the work done in this area is very noteworthy from the viewpoint of "great politics." The writings of Bereczky in this regard well document the development of this area of activity and Bereczky himself saw well the international significance of this example. He spoke about this in 1952 at a pastoral conference: "In the course of this great world historical transformation the Hungarian Reformed Church was the first Protestant Christian church with a great historical past and with a large number of members which lived in the midst of the revolution. Do you recognize what a great thing this is? I believe that God wants to maintain and use this church."

The internal political changes between 1953 and 1956, especially the 1956 counterrevolutionary revolt, put the strategic line of the Reformed Church leadership to the test. But the defeat of the counterrevolution and the consolidation which took place in 1957 strengthened the political program of the church leadership and prompted its further development. At the end of 1957 Bereczky himself summarized most pregnantly the essence of this growing program in a statement made before the Presidential Council of the People's Republic: "It is especially in three areas that we saw and see the church service standing before us in developing the new Hungarian form of life. One is to awaken and nourish a communal spirit. Socialism needs socialist men who know not how to live beside one another but rather how to live together and to live for one another's good. Our church has a serious service in this human forming work. The second area is encouraging work morality.... Our Bible obliges us to consider work well done an

honorable thing because it is written that 'He who does not want to work shall not eat'.... The third area is the most beautiful and the most profound but one which penetrates to the roots of family and individual life, service for peace.... This task is not only ours, as Hungarians, but the entire world's.... The world, mankind, has become one great neighborhood and the fate of everyone affects everyone. In such a situation preserving and protecting the peace of mankind is a priority mission for men of the church."

In this program-like statement, as can be easily seen, there remained the basic theological line worked out earlier but in regard to its social teachings this program had been developed further. It is enough for us to call attention to the possibility for church service in the area of developing a "communal spirit" or encouraging work morality.

These will be the points to which the leading theologians of the church will stick in the next period to further develop the theological teachings of the Reformed Church to give a broader and more complex exposition of the so-called "theology of the servant church."

On the 10th anniversary of his own service as bishop and of the Agreement, in the fall of 1958, Albert Bereczky himself drew up a balance of the road taken.

Before all else he emphasized that the new theological concept had made a way for itself amidst complex fighting conditions. "It would be difficult now even to list on how many fronts we had to fight and suffer for the acceptance of this Biblical vision of obedience in faith. It is enough to recall that there were always retrograde attempts from both left and right. On the one side there were those who wanted to flee from the world, a barren piety which often sank unnoticed into political adventism and nihilism. On the other side there was a plunging into the world which wanted to see the Country of God in the new social order outright, which often was nothing more and is nothing more than careerism and opportunism. The times just past say enough about how the two often masqueraded as each other and became comrades of one another."

The "times just past" when the enemies of the chief theological and political line of the church became "comrades of one another" refers to the time of the 1956 counterrevolutionary revolt. Bereczky, essentially correctly, condemned this period with very strong words: "A sober and just judgment of the situation should include a reckoning with the immeasurable damage and relapse caused by the year 1956 which began with such high hopes and ended with such a grim catastrophe. The church was not at its place and did not do what should have been done and our church itself fell far from that road it had followed up to then and on which there was a possibility for the correction of errors and for an ever more fruitful life."

This is a profound self-criticism--"our church itself fell far from that road it had followed up to then"--and a just self-criticism. Because the

Reformed Church, which from the time of the signing of the Agreement had found the correct road, showed a much greater break in the fall of 1956 than did, for example, the Roman Catholic Church in which forces aspiring to sincerely cooperate with socialism did not get into the supreme leadership, the Bench of Bishops, so that the 1956 action of Mindszenty actually only tried to legalize the existing, reactionary, counterrevolutionary political line in the supreme church leadership. Prior to 1956 a theological "reorientation" had not even started in the Roman Catholic Church. (Among other things because Pius XII was still Pope up to 1958!)

At the same time this self-criticism was a little exaggerated because the legal leaders of the Reformed Church, including Albert Bereczky, stuck by their earlier policy in 1956 and insofar as possible fought against the church revolt. So, in 1958, it was just for Bereczky to reaffirm the political and theological conception followed up to then. "For my part I do not see today any other path than that on which we began, not without errors and sometimes falling flat but at least with obedience in faith."

In accordance with its title the quoted speech of Bereczky not only looked back but also forward. He joined with agreement the published opinion of the Revolutionary Worker Peasant Government that the relations of state and church had to be regulated on a basis of principle. From the side of the state this demand was expressed by Premier Janos Kadar on 28 January 1958 in closing the debate on the report of the government to the National Assembly. Janos Kadar spoke there in a direct manner about questions of cooperation with the Roman Catholic Church but, naturally, in a way which could be generalized to the other churches. Recalling one comment he said the following: "Everyday cooperation is good, at least between the government and the Bench of Bishops. We are striving to discuss and debate the contradictions and differences of view which arise in the course of life and finally to come to some decision. This is a good and useful thing. But in our opinion a more lasting foundation in principle is needed in state and church relations, in cooperation between state and church! We think that those church leaders are proceeding wisely who free the pastors and believers of conflicts of conscience. They can be freed. The only thing necessary for this is that they stick to the principles of their faith, without which there is no pastor and no believer for they would be no longer pastor nor believer, and that in addition they accept the building of a popular democratic system, of a socialist society, as a social program. In this case there would be no conflict of conscience and people would not have to ponder whether my obedience to the Pope conflicted with my loyalty as a citizen or should I maintain my loyalty as a citizen and so violate my church obligations to the Pope."

This demand came from the side of the government. What we witness here is that simultaneously with the closing of the period of consolidation the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party was trying to build the individual pillars of its main political line in a program-like fashion along every line. It did all this on a principled basis of Marxism-Leninism and in

laying the foundations of this policy it made demands on all its partners. In doing this it outlined according to what basic principles, from its side, the necessary theoretical and political adjustment it thought could be realized in the various areas.

Albert Bereczky saw well that this demand had to be reacted to and that one had to say clearly what the position of the church was in regard to the basic principles indicated by the party and government. "Clearly it is now up to us to say honestly what we will undertake, what we can help and serve and what is incompatible with our faith.... From the side of the church, for example, we can undertake, according to our heart and on the basis of our faith, our place and service in the peace movement and especially in the struggle against atomic weapons with the internal conviction of faith. We can assume that the well being, communal life, internal peace and spiritual and material progress of our people are causes which we can make our own and support with love. But we can say openly, and we do it in harmony with the position of our government, that we do not agree with the ruling ideology and we will not agree with it. Only people with sincere spirits can create and serve such an open and honest relationship."

The normal cooperation between our People's Republic and the Reformed Church was built anew on this basis, supported by the principled policy of the party and government from the side of our socialist state and on the basis of the principles expressed here from the side of the Reformed Church.

In the past two decades, in harmony with the stable main political line of our party and our government, these principles have defined the practical activity of Hungarian Calvinism under the conditions of the building of socialism.

In the past two decades the theological conception of the Hungarian Reformed Church, the so-called "theology of the servant church," has become more profound and has been further enriched in the theological-theoretical sense. Church practice built on this conception--supported by the internal political development based on a consistent political line and by the more favorable circumstances provided by the international detente which followed the forcing into the background of the cold war period in the international class struggle--has effectively served and still serves, with its unique tools, those tasks which the church leadership assumed in the program outlined.

Without turning to a more detailed characterization of this period I would like to merely indicate that the supreme church leadership now realized by Bishop Tibor Bartha is realizing good cooperation in the area of the building of socialism and in the international peace movement, both in the internal political practice of the church and especially in its international activity, through intensive exploitation of the many-sided possibilities of the Christian peace movement.

III. Several General Conclusions in Regard to the Contemporary Practice of Hungarian Calvinism

In the foregoing I tried, deliberately, to sketch primarily the historical motifs of the development of the theological conception which constitutes the foundation of the contemporary political practice of the Hungarian Reformed Church.

We have seen that the new theological conception, the "theology of the servant church," bearing the mark of the name of Albert Bereczky but naturally developed with the cooperation of many other theologians, received its theoretical inspiration in many respects from that significant 20th century theological trend which Karl Barth developed, breaking with both the Protestant liberal theology and the various neo-orthodox Protestant, primarily Calvinist, trends.

The new theological conception which has been developed, however, is not simply a version or school of Barthianism but rather a very significant new conception which has an inspiration from and followers in foreign Protestant theology (e.g., the Czechoslovak Hromadka and others) and yet we can say with a close approximation that it has been created by Hungarian Reformed Church theology which developed it into a trend the relative independence and significance of which is increasingly recognized even in international theological literature.

It would require a separate detailed theoretical examination to show what is new in this theological conception and how it has gone forward on the road of traditional Calvinist dogmatics. But we cannot undertake this on this occasion.

The fact which interests us now can be summarized as follows.

Hungarian Reformed Church theology succeeded, after the liberation, in developing a theological conception in the possession of which it was able to break radically, in its practical policy, from the so-called "Constantine epoch," that is, from a policy realized from the "ruling church" position of ideological support for the exploiting ruling classes in society. This, realizing the practice of the "servant church," created an opportunity for the religious workers under its influence to participate without conflict of conscience in the social process of building socialism.

The subjective goal of the church leaders and of the theologians working out this conception is clear; with this theological conception they wanted to prolong the life of religion and the church.

Marxist-Leninist religious criticism must examine the objective causes of this view thoroughly. Certainly what is involved, or part of what is involved, is that bourgeois democratic aspects in the "classic" social doctrine of Calvinism have been extrapolated onto socialism.

It is obvious that there are lasting objective possibilities for this in the process of building socialism. For in the period of the development of socialist democracy many aspects can be found in society which, mutatis mutandis, "remind one" of bourgeois democracy. There can be no doubt, as the classics of Marxism point out in many ways, that in this respect socialism carries in itself the remnants of the "egg shell" of capitalism.

Calvinism, which was born in the period of the development of the capitalist social order as the religious ideology of the developing, rising bourgeoisie, cannot only support itself objectively on its unique traditions which thus derive but can even nourish in itself the reassuring feeling that by reviving the "traditions of the reformers" it can sweep from its theological theory and church practice all that which was added to the "original" reformist ideology in the period of declining capitalism. (It is not by chance that the Barthian trend not only calls itself "dialectical theology" and the "theology of the Word" but also often the "theology of the reformers.") But in this process, methodologically, the Barthians and their Hungarian followers developing the "theology of the servant church" are doing nothing more than adapting to the classic reformist principle of "ecclesia semper reformari debet" (The church must be constantly reformed!).

It is certain that this theological adaptation does significantly prolong the historical existence of Calvinism. We must reckon with this in our own religious criticism activity.

But, I think, it is also obvious that despite this it is a problematic and in many respects illusory desire of some Reformed Church theologians to organically and even finally "integrate" their religion into the socialist social order, especially to make it compatible with Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The truth is, as set forth in detail in its fundamentally important resolution of 1958 by the Political Committee of the MSZMP and emphasized again and again in later statements (in the resolutions of 4 March 1968 and of 3 December 1973), that religion is in our society the non-Marxist trend with the greatest ideological influence and that the churches are the non-Marxist organizations most to be reckoned with.

Naturally, in our contemporary practice, the "theology of the servant church" and the Calvinist political practice based thereon offer favorable opportunities for cooperation in the building of socialism with the working strata under the influence of the Reformed Church and with those of other persuasions.

This theological conception is also suitable for aiding religious workers to participate in the common work of building society without conflicts of conscience or of world-view if they honestly participate in the building of socialism as a forming of their own fate.

Thus the task of Marxist-Leninist religious criticism work is to further examine those motifs of this church and theological conception and practice which converge with socialist policy and provide an opportunity for cooperation as well as those essential elements of it which, due to their world-view content, continue to stand in antagonistic contradiction to Marxism-Leninism.

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YUGOSLAVIA

ERCTION OF OBSTACLES IN POTENTIAL ENEMY AIR LANDING ZONES

Belgrade VOJNI GLASNIK in Serbo-Croatian No 6, Nov-Dec 76 pp 16-41

[Article by Maj Gen Milan Burcul: "Purpose and Tasks of Engineer Preparation of Potential Enemy Air Landing Zones"]

[Text] Engineer preparation of potential enemy air landing zones consists of a group of engineer operations performed by units of the YPA [Yugoslav People's Army], territorial defense units and civilian structures in order to ensure rapid and unhindered movement of the units conducting combat operations against enemy airborne forces; to protect personnel and equipment in the period of preparation and during combat; to create (as needed) maximum stability of defense and on the whole to guarantee the most favorable conditions for the fighting and life of our own units and to ensure the maneuvers of forces and materiel. Another task of engineer preparation is to make it difficult for airborne assault forces to land and group, to slow down and channel their actions, to create uncertainty in their action, and to inflict losses on personnel and equipment.

The mode of operation and the support of airborne assault forces confronts engineer preparation of potential enemy air landing zones with very complex and extensive tasks which will have to be performed under difficult conditions and in a short period of time. Engineer preparation of potential enemy air landing zones must in principle be done simultaneously to a great depth or even over an entire territory.

Territorial defense units and other civilian structures will be involved to a greater extent in engineer support of antilanding combat than is the case in engineer support of defensive or offensive operations. That is why the engineer group of the superior command should precisely plan the tasks and reach an understanding in all details with the relevant territorial defense staffs and national defense secretariats whose units are involved in engineer preparation of potential enemy air landing zones.

The tasks of engineer support are basically the same as in all other combat operations. The principal tasks are to erect obstacles, strengthen positions and ensure the possibility of movement and maneuvers. In this article we will be discussing only the erection of obstacles.

Erection of Obstacles in Potential Enemy Air Landing Zones

The erection of obstacles is one of the principal tasks of engineer support of antilanding combat and it is done by all units designated for antilanding combat and when necessary by other organized civilian structures. The erection of obstacles includes the use of equipment and materials issued and at hand to erect diverse antipersonnel obstacles, anti-tank barriers and obstacles to the landing of aircraft and the skillful combination of these obstacles with one another and their adaptation to the terrain.

The principal aim of erecting obstacles is to impede the landing of the air assault, to inflict casualties and losses of equipment, to check and slow down the advance on directions that lead toward the objective of the attack, and in certain situations to force the air assault to land in an area where it will be exposed to effective fire and the actions of forces assigned to antilanding combat or to give up plans to use particular potential air landing zones. It also has the purpose of increasing the combat ability of forces assigned to antilanding combat, of protecting areas and positions, and on the whole of making it easier to carry out the tasks that have been assigned.

The types of obstacles and barriers which can be used in potential enemy air landing zones are as follows:

- i. artificial--obstacles consisting of mines and booby traps, fieldworks, barriers created by demolition, and obstacles resulting from inundation of terrain and fire;
- ii. natural--rivers, lakes and swampy, forested and rocky terrain;
- iii. other obstacles and barriers--chemical and radioactive obstacles, obstacles on the terrain resulting from construction and urban planning, and the planting of crops with special characteristics.

Explosive Mine Obstacles and Their Use and Effectiveness in Potential Enemy Air Landing Zones

Explosive mine obstacles are a very effective type of obstacle in potential enemy air landing zones, and they should be used on a large scale whenever possible.

Minefields which are laid to combat air landings may belong to the following types with respect to purpose: antipersonnel minefields, antitank

minefields, minefields to prevent the landing of aircraft, and composite minefields consisting of more than one type.

Antipersonnel minefields consisting of fragmentation mines are the most commonly used for antiairborne purposes. Thanks to their technical characteristics, in that they are very effective even in relatively small numbers, these mines can be used to obstruct large areas of zones suitable for the dropping of a parachute assault force. Antipersonnel minefields consisting of pressure-action mines are not effective in obstructing these areas because of the small area that is tread upon. These minefields can be effectively used in obstructing the immediate area of the paratroop force's objective and along the directions of its attack.

Antitank minefields are mainly used to obstruct the immediate areas of objectives of an attack and along directions of the airborne or paratroop assault force's attack. At landing or dropping sites they are used within areas where aircraft are expected to land and possibly in an area where it is expected that heavy combat and other equipment will be dropped. The value of antitank minefields in obstructing potential enemy air landing zones is very relative in view of the possibility of using other types of obstacles. If grassy areas are used, it can be effective to plow them up, and if there are concrete runways, demolition is very effective.

The ever greater technical capabilities of present-day transport planes which are used to airlift units and combat equipment in the complement of these units makes it a necessity to obstruct those routes which lead from the landing or dropping zone to the objective of the action and to erect obstructions in the immediate vicinity of the objective, using antitank minefields to a greater extent than in the past. Minelaying along the routes of the attack and in the immediate areas of objectives is done mainly in accordance with the principles that govern minelaying in the context of defensive operations.

If minefields are to be effective, consideration must be given to the technical condition of proper choice of the type and density of mines in minefields in view of the type of airborne or paratroop assault force which is expected and also to the tactical condition of proper selection of sites for laying minefields with respect to the dropping or landing zone and site. Otherwise the minefields will not be complete and effective.

The full obstructive value can be obtained by correct choice of the type of mine, the density of mines in the minefield, and the site for laying minefields within potential enemy air landing or dropping zones; the purpose is to inflict losses on the assault force at the moment when it touches the ground, when it is grouping, and when it is moving toward its objective, and to make it insecure in its movements.

The following are mainly used in preparing explosive obstacles against paratroop and airborne assault forces: trip-action antipersonnel fragmentation mines, pressure-action antipersonnel mines, antitank mines, improvised mines, booby traps and fougasses.

Pressure-action antipersonnel mines have a low obstructive value, which means that a large number of mines must be used to obstruct a paratroop drop zone, and they are therefore uneconomical for this type of minelaying.

Trip-action antipersonnel mines have a high obstructive value; the diameter of the killing effect ranges from 30 to 50 meters, and that of the wounding effect ranges from 40 to 100 meters. They are suitable for mining paratroop drop zones, and a good obstructive value is achieved with a relatively small number of mines.

Antitank mines can be effectively used to mine terrain suitable for the landing of aircraft and for the movement and maneuvers of combat and non-combat vehicles.

Improvised mines represent a very effective type of explosive obstacle. They are prepared and used most frequently in situations when regulation supplies are lacking. Their effectiveness and obstructive value depend on the combination of materials in which the explosive is used and on whether they are devised from aerial bombs, artillery shells, mortar shells, hand grenades or similar ammunition. The killing and wounding characteristics depend on the type of materials used to devise the mines. Depending on the method of improvisation, these mines require quite a long time to make any quantity, and longer training of personnel is required in the method of laying them. They are not suitable for obstructing large areas.

Booby traps and delayed-action mines are used at sites and on structures which will be used by the paratroop or airborne assault force. These are usually airfield installations and other structures, and their characteristics depend on the amount and type of each mine or explosive that is used. They have a very high destructive and psychological effect.

Fougasses are fairly effective obstacles against combat and noncombat vehicles. They require a special system for controlled actuation, and they are therefore rarely used in obstructing potential enemy airdrop and landing zones.

All of these explosive and other techniques are widely used by themselves or in combinations in any particular system of minelaying that is chosen in view of their technical characteristics. The choice and quantity will depend on the specific assessments, the situation and possibilities in view of the available time and available supplies, as well as on the number of men and equipment used to lay them.

In addition to the explosive obstacles so far enumerated, obstacles created by demolition also have an important role in obstructing potential enemy airdrop and landing zones. The readiest structures for demolition in potential enemy airdrop and landing zones will be structures on routes which the air assault force will use to reach its objective. All structures whose demolition, according to the assessment, could slow down or channel the action of the air assault force must be looked upon and prepared for demolition as very effective obstacles. Particular attention should be paid to structures whose negotiation would require that the air assault units use specific regulation equipment. In addition to structures along routes, it is also important to demolish airfield installations and structures in order to prevent or impede the landing of aircraft and the short-term or long-term use of the airfield.

Nonexplosive Obstacles and Their Use in Obstructing Potential Enemy Airdrop and Landing Zones

All types of nonexplosive antitank and antipersonnel obstacles and obstacles to prevent the landing of aircraft are used on a large scale in obstructing potential enemy airdrop and landing zones. If they are used correctly and in good time, they can be effective in obstructing areas suitable for airdrops and landings of assault forces, the directions of the attack, and the immediate areas of objectives of the attack by the air assault force, especially when there is not a sufficient supply of mines and other explosives.* The use of all nonexplosive and other obstacles is particularly extensive in obstructing large potential enemy airdrop and landing zones where paratroop drops and the landing of aircraft are expected. In making an assessment and a decision on the use of these obstacles, one should bear in mind that the manufacture and placement of various nonexplosive obstacles require relatively more time and men, particularly when appropriate machines are not available to do the work. All nonexplosive engineer obstacles should always be reinforced with mines and other explosives and combined with appropriate minefields when the conditions exist so as to augment their obstructive value.

Nonexplosive antitank obstacles and other obstacles to the landing of aircraft are erected on grassy areas--airfields--to prevent the landing of aircraft and also along routes on which units will operate to support the air assault force. The obstacles most widely used are these: ditches to obstruct aircraft, antitank ditches, antitank palisades of driven stakes, concrete and steel hedgehogs and tetrahedra. The effectiveness of these barriers and their obstructive value depend on the precision with which they are placed with respect to the landing directions of aircraft and the directions in which the air assault force will

* The physical types of antipersonnel, antitank and antilanding obstacles are given in Appendix 1 along with the essential technical data and the time needed to erect the various obstacles.

operate. Erection of these obstacles by and large requires earthmoving machines, power tools for working with wood, and farm machines suitable for deep plowing. When possible, this type of barrier should be keyed to existing natural obstacles. The drawbacks of these obstacles are that they are easily detected from the air, so that they can be bypassed, and some of them cannot be erected during the preparation for defense unless they have already been manufactured ahead of time (tetrahedra, iron hedgehogs and concrete blocks).

Antipersonnel wire entanglements and other nonexplosive obstacles are always used in obstructing potential enemy airdrop and landing zones. The advantage of these obstacles is that they can be made, carried and erected easily and quickly. Their effectiveness and obstructive value depend on how extensively they are used and how well the sites are chosen. They are intended primarily to frustrate and impede paratroops in dropping, assembling and moving toward their objectives.

In addition to the customary nonexplosive antitank and antipersonnel obstacles and barriers, effective use can also be made of improvised obstacles against airborne and paratroop assaults; they can be made from old and discarded gasoline and other drums filled with earth, stones and other material, old vehicles or parts of them, and miscellaneous building materials (timber and lumber, concrete pipe in various shapes, and so on), particularly in obstructing grassy areas suitable for the landing of aircraft.

Whenever antipersonnel and antitank obstacles and obstacles to obstruct all types of airdrops and landings are erected, one must take care that they do not serve as shelters for protection and combat operations of the airborne or paratroop assault force. This aim is achieved by combining the obstacles skillfully with various antipersonnel mines and by fitting the nonexplosive barriers with other obstacles consisting of mines and explosives.

The type of obstacles which will be used more extensively will depend on the specific possibilities afforded by the terrain, the prior preparations that have been made, and the materials available for devising the obstacles.

Natural and Other Obstacles and Their Importance in Obstructing Paratroop and Airborne Assault Forces

In analyzing the natural obstacles on a terrain suitable for enemy airdrop and landing zones, one might conclude that about 50 percent of the total area of the terrain in airdrop and landing zones is unsuitable for that purpose because of natural obstacles. This number of natural obstacles makes it much easier to precisely evaluate airdrop and landing sites and in general to erect obstructions.

When the erection of obstructions is fitted into the system of natural obstacles, there is a much smaller need for artificial barriers and obstacles of both the explosive and nonexplosive types. One can then be more effective and thorough in obstructing possible airdrop and landing zones, routes along which air assault forces will operate, and the objectives of the attack. Whenever natural obstacles are entirely or partially fitted into the system of obstruction, they should be reinforced with minefields and nonexplosive obstacles.

The term "other obstacles" refers to all man-made obstacles which may be found or erected in a potential enemy airdrop and landing zone and which have an immediate impact on the possibility of using the zone for those purposes. These obstacles usually result from construction and urban planning of the terrain, for example: settlements of various sizes, the high-voltage long-distance power transmission network, overhead telegraph and telephone lines, areas which can be deliberately flooded, areas in which large fires might be set, and chemical and radioactive barriers. These obstacles can be effectively keyed to other artificial and natural obstacles.

Water obstacles are created by deliberate flooding of the terrain, by releasing water into man-made canals and antitank ditches, by demolishing dams or dikes at times of high water. Water obstacles are created by raising the level of water in order to increase the extent of natural water obstacles, which is done by building dams or erecting obstructions on streams.

When obstacles of this kind are devised, one must take care that the flooding does not create barriers for friendly forces and does not jeopardize the population. In planning the flooding one must take into account the time needed to do it and then time it for when the airborne or paratroop assault is expected. Flooding should be done in suitable areas where an airborne or paratroop landing is expected as a certainty.

Areas crisscrossed by the network of long-distance power transmission lines and overhead telegraph and telephone lines will impede the landing of aircraft, and the electric power from the network of long-distance transmission lines can be effectively used to electrify wire barriers.

Settlements in a potential airdrop or landing area represent a special type of obstacle that deters the airdrop or landing, they represent structures suitable for use in combat against enemy airborne or paratroop assault forces as a form of support for action aimed at dispersing and destroying that force.

Areas Which Need To Be Obstructed in a Potential Enemy Airdrop and Landing Zone With Respect to the Size of the Areas Necessary for the Airdrop or Landing

On the basis of an analysis of a potential enemy airdrop or landing zone one might find that in the area suitable for the airdrop or landing of one airborne division there are a great number of natural obstacles (forests, rivers, settlements, stony ground and the like) which limit the possibility of landing or dropping airborne troops. The number of natural obstacles vary from zone to zone, but on the average the restriction would probably amount to about 50 percent of the zone's area.

So that we might examine more realistically areas which are suitable and necessary for airdrop and landing zones, we will discuss the area necessary to drop or land an airborne division in the case when 50 percent of the zone's area is unsuitable for dropping or landing. According to Soviet views, an airborne division needs a zone of about $1,200 \text{ km}^2$, while according to American views the requirement is about 400 km^2 , which means that the area usable for landing or dropping would be 600 km^2 in the first case and 200 km^2 in the second. Assuming that a paratroop regiment needs about 50 km^2 (10×5) for a drop, while a paratroop brigade needs 60 km^2 (10×6), and since we have three regiments (brigades) which have to have separate zones, we then need an area of 150 (50×3) or 180 km^2 (60×3). In this example 450 km^2 of a zone of $1,200 \text{ km}^2$ would still be unassigned, and it would always be possible to change the zones for the airborne regiments, while within the 400-km^2 zone there is only 20 km^2 left, and in this case the zones cannot be changed, but the drop must be made on the suitable terrain that has been designated.

The results are still better if we look at the area necessary to drop a battalion. A battalion needs 6 km^2 (3×2) to make its drop according to Soviet views and $3-5 \text{ km}^2$ according to American views. In principle the airborne division has nine paratroop battalions each of which should be given a separate zone, which means that the drop would require only about $45-54 \text{ km}^2$ (9×5 or 9×6). If we take one reserve zone for each battalion, we would then need $90-108 \text{ km}^2$ of area suitable for the drop, which certainly can be provided for in a airdrop or landing zone of the size we are talking about.

These considerations concerning the size of airdrop and landing zones necessary to make paratroop drops and helicopter landings allow the conclusion that there are quite enough zones which are possible and suitable for airdrops and landings and that on the whole the terrain will not preclude the use of airborne troops, but will only reduce the capacity of the zone by a certain percentage and thereby reduce the possibility of changing the drop or landing site for the airborne brigade, although within these battalions it is possible to change the drop or landing zones.

The fact that the terrain reduces the area of the zone that can actually be used for the drop or the landing does not affect the amount of obstructions to be devised very much, since obstructions cannot be computed in terms of the area suitable for a drop or landing. The fact that not all the terrain is suitable makes it easier to determine the actual landing or drop zone, so that obstacles can be located more realistically.

In assessing and selecting the sites and areas where obstacles are to be installed, the points of departure are the purpose and tasks of the airborne assaults, the targets of the attacks, and the routes which lead to those targets, and on that basis one evaluates the primary and reserve drop and landing zones.

The question is which area within an airdrop or landing zone should realistically be obstructed, and how should one undertake to compute the material needed for installation of the obstructions? There may be different approaches to this problem, but mainly three basic variants are possible:

1. to obstruct the entire area suitable for drop or landing even though it is far larger than necessary for the drop or landing and even though some areas cannot be used because of their distance from the objective;
2. to obstruct the area required to drop or land an airborne regiment and airborne brigade;
3. to obstruct the area necessary for dropping or landing an airborne battalion.

Each of these approaches involves certain illogicalities, but the best solution must be found by assessing each specific situation.

With regard to the reliability and soundness of the obstruction, one should obstruct all areas suitable for a drop or landing. There are two serious drawbacks in this variant: first, large amounts of material and personnel are required to erect the obstructions, and second, some parts of the zone would be obstructed though they have no tactical justification relative to the operation's purpose and targets. This approach is therefore unrealistic and unacceptable in practice, and it should be rejected as a method of computation.

If we take the variant in which we obstruct the area necessary for the drop or landing of an airborne regiment and brigade, the area which should be obstructed is 150 or 180 km². This variant, because of the smaller area involved, makes it possible to be comparatively thorough in erecting obstructions, and it is fairly realistic with regard to the possibility of installing the obstacles, although the amount of material is still great. In this and in other variants most or all of the mine-fields could be laid with low-density (about 200 trip-action antipersonnel

mines per square kilometer). This provides satisfactory density of the obstruction and reduces the number of mines.

If we take the variant in which we obstruct only areas required to land the battalion, then this is a fairly small area--45 or 54 km². This variant is quite favorable from the standpoint of the amount of material required, and it makes it possible to achieve a sound density of obstruction, but a very small area has been obstructed, and the airborne assault force could avoid the obstacles and the obstructed zones by landing in another favorable place within the regimental airdrop or landing zone, since within the space of 50 km² there are slightly more than eight favorable zones. We might adopt this variant in extreme necessity when we have limited personnel and materiel or in a situation when the assessment can ascertain the precise site for the drop or landing of the battalion.

We can realistically assume that we will obstruct not only the primary landing and dropping zone of the battalion, but also one reserve zone. In this variant the regiment's drop and landing zone would include three primary drop and landing zones for battalions and three reserve zones for battalions, which would mean obstructing 36 km² (6 x 6). Within a division's drop or landing zone one would have to install obstructions on 108 km² (36 x 3). This area is quite realistic, since low-density minefields and other obstacles can be used to ensure a satisfactory density of obstruction.

Of the methods we have discussed, we can adopt the variants in which the entire area of a regiment's drop and landing zone would be obstructed with low-density minefields, or within the regimental drop and landing zone one would obstruct the primary and reserve drop or landing zone for each battalion. It is not possible to determine in advance which variant should be used; the essential thing is to ensure a higher density of obstruction in landing and dropping zones for airborne divisions where the brunt of the attack is expected. The effectiveness of the obstruction is very much affected by a precise assessment of the drop or landing zone. When we are able to accurately define the zones and if we obstruct only the primary drop or landing zones of battalions, they can be completely obstructed with a very good density.

Zones Which Should Be Obstructed at Air Landing and Drop Sites, Emphasis in Installation of Obstacles, and the Relevant Factors

In assessing the obstruction of airdrop and landing zones it is very important to correctly determine the areas within the zones which would actually be obstructed because a zone for the drop or landing of an airborne division is very large. The following smaller regions are singled out within the entire airdrop or landing zone to be obstructed:

- i. the airdrop or landing zone is evaluated on the basis of an assessment of where the drop or landing will be made in view of the targets of

the attack. If the estimate is that the target will be attacked by a battalion, it is logical to obstruct the area required to land or drop a battalion and possibly one or two spare zones. If it is judged that the target would be attacked by a regiment, then one takes the area necessary for dropping or landing a regiment. If the assessment is that airborne assault forces will attack in battalions among two or more directions, then the landing or drop will most probably be made by battalions, and in the assessment of obstruction one should take the area separately for each battalion, including possible reserve airdrop and landing zones;

ii. routes for operation of airborne assault units in reaching the target of the attack (assuming the force has not dropped or landed right at the target) should be evaluated on the basis of the units carrying out the attack. Usually these would be battalion or regimental routes, and on that basis one would assess the material necessary for obstruction;

iii. the target should be assessed from the standpoint of its importance to the airborne assault forces and the possibility of its being taken by a direct landing on the target or by an assault when the drop or landing is made at some distance from the target. It is on the basis of this kind of assessment that one evaluates the obstruction of targets. If in the airdrop or landing zone there is an airfield with concrete runways, this would probably be the focus of the obstruction;

iv. the defense zone of units is assessed depending on their initial deployment. If the units for defending the target are deployed within the target itself, obstruction of the units' defense zone is adjusted to obstruction of the zone of the target itself.

The emphasis in installation of obstacles will depend on the purpose of antilanding combat and may fall within the zone of the target of the airborne assault; in the defense zone of the unit if it is defending the objective within its immediate vicinity; along the route of operation by the airborne assault force; or in the airdrop or landing zone. This order as to the importance of obstacles might still hold if the assessment is that the airborne assault will not be dispersed or destroyed, but it will manage to assemble and launch an attack on the objective. If the assessment concludes that the forces committed to antilanding combat will disperse or destroy the airborne force before it organizes to attack the objective and that the objective cannot be taken, the target would then not be at the center of the obstruction. In this case the emphasis in installation of obstacles might be in the airdrop or landing zone and along the operational routes of the airborne assault force. In evaluating a paratroop landing zone from the standpoint of obstruction, we should bear in mind that it is very difficult to determine the precise drop site, since it is not difficult to change the site of a drop and avoid obstacles which have been erected.

Several types of obstacles are most commonly used for obstructions in an airdrop or landing zone. Which obstacles will be used more depends on the type of landing. The obstacles will be primarily antipersonnel if the entire landing will be made by parachute. In view of the armament of airborne assault units, the obstruction must in any case include antitank obstacles and obstacles to prevent the landing of aircraft. It is just a question of the relationship among the types of obstacles.

Taking all the circumstances into account, antipersonnel obstacles, consisting of trip-action antipersonnel mines when possible, should be laid in the drop zone and along the route of its attack. The zone where transport planes are expected to land with airborne forces and heavy equipment and the routes of their operation should be obstructed with a combination of obstacles or primarily with antitank obstacles and obstacles to the landing of aircraft. In a zone where there are airfields, obstruction is mainly done by demolishing runways and other important structures for aircraft support and operation.

Computation of Trip-Action Antipersonnel Mines to Mine Zones Suitable for Air Assault Drop or Landing, the Density of Mines in the Minefield, the Obstructive Value of the Various Minelaying Techniques, and the Basic Diagrams for Obstructing an Airdrop and Landing Zone for an Airborne Division, Including Computation of the Necessary Quantities of Materiel

When obstacles are being erected in the zone of targets of an airborne assault and along the routes of that attack, especially when forces have been assigned to defend them in good time, one uses the densities and principles of minelaying that are valid in defensive operations, along with the specific considerations that result from the different types of mines. If tanks and other armor are not expected along the route, obstruction need not be done with antitank mines. On the whole the obstruction should always be adapted to the specific situation, the mode of operation, and the composition of the airborne force.

In computing mines to obstruct an airdrop or landing zone one must depart to some extent from the computation of the trip-action antipersonnel mines needed in a minefield and from the manner of minelaying which are valid in defensive operations.

In principle when one is obstructing an airdrop or landing zone computations of mines and explosives should be based on area, and the basic unit is the square kilometer. This is necessary because the area of the landing ground and dropping zone is also computed in square kilometers. Minefields consisting of trip-action antipersonnel mines might also to some extent be laid on the basis of the square kilometer, but minefields consisting of pressure-action antipersonnel mines and antitank mines, regardless of the computation, should be laid according to the customary rules and prescribed methods with respect to the width and depth of each minefield. Were we to take trip-action antipersonnel mines according to

the prescribed quotas (1 mine per 3-5 meters of width of the minefield), then a minefield 100 meters wide and about 100 meters deep would take about 200-333 trip-action antipersonnel mines, and a square kilometer would take 2,000-3,330 trip-action antipersonnel mines. It is obvious that these are very large numbers of mines, and if we were to take a zone amounting to 100 km², then we would have to have 200,000-333,000 trip-action antipersonnel mines. This type of computation is not acceptable from the technical standpoint because of the large numbers of mines, nor is it justified from the tactical standpoint.

Mine density ratios of trip-action antipersonnel mines vary because of the quantities we have mentioned, though the densities of mines in the minefields still bear the usual descriptive terms: normal density, low density and high density of mines in the minefields. When trip-action antipersonnel mines are used to obstruct an airdrop and landing zone, the densities referred to by these descriptive terms are as follows:

By "normal" mine density in the minefields we mean a mutual distribution of the mines so that the spheres of their wounding effect touch one another. This distribution of the mines gives quite good obstructive effect, but on the whole it calls for quite a few mines per square kilometer. Data on the distribution of mines in the fields, the number of mines needed per square kilometer of the minefields, the area of the wounding effect, the obstructive value, and other technical data are given in Appendices 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. These appendices offer two distributions of the mines for all three types of trip-action antipersonnel mines.

Appendix 2 gives under a, b and c mining methods in which the mines are laid in rows running lengthwise and crosswise of the minefield. This laying of the minefield requires a rather large number of mines. The requirements per square kilometer are as follows for the three types of trip-action personnel mines: 625 PMR-2A [PMR--antipersonnel fragmentation mine], 400 PROM-1 [PROM--bounding antipersonnel fragmentation mine] and 100 PMR-3. Because this is such a large number of mines, it is not economical to mine entire potential airdrop and landing zones, nor to lay minefields with always the same number per square kilometer. This method should be used to mine minimal areas, and they should be only at the decisive points and sites where the drop or landing is expected with complete confidence.

Appendices 3, 4 and 5 show another layout of the minefield, one which is made up of groups of seven mines. The advantage of this layout over the previous one is that there are fewer mines per square kilometer of minefield. The number of mines required per square kilometer is 448 PMR-2A, 343 PROM-1 and 63 PMR-3. If we multiply the reduction in the number of mines per square kilometer by the total area to be mined, the saving represents an important item (a saving of between 3,700 and 17,700 mines over an area of 100 km²). In addition to the saving in mines, this layout affords the possibilities of laying minefields in the following sizes:

120 x 120 meters, 150 x 150 meters and 300 x 300 meters, without taking into account the special combinations. By continuing these groups of mines laterally and depthwise, one obtains a minefield of the desired dimensions.

Although this layout requires slightly fewer mines than the previous one, it still is not expedient for mining large areas. That is why this layout should be used only for the decisive points where an airdrop or landing is expected with high probability. It is not suitable to use PMR-2A and PROM-1 mines to mine the entire square kilometer, since that requires quite a few mines, and we would not be able to mine large areas.

If we are to mine the entire square kilometer with normal mine density, then it is best to use PMR-3 together with the other mines in each group. Appendix 7, which shows Variant A₁, and Appendix 8, which shows Variant A₂, give this layout with the necessary data. This layout affords a satisfactory density with a relatively small number of mines: in Variant A₁--56 and in Variant A₂--63 PMR-3. If we use this layout in mining 100 km², we would need only 5,600-6,300 mines, a number that can always be furnished.

By low mine density in the minefield we mean a relative distribution of the mines in which the spheres prescribed by the casualty radius do not touch, but there is a distance of one radius or one diameter between the groups of mines in the rows of the minefield. The data on the layout, the necessary number of mines per square kilometer, the effective casualty area, the obstructive value and other technical details are given in Appendices 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15.

It is evident from the appendices that there can be several combinations in laying the minefields. Numbers 9a, 10, 11 and 12 provide four variants of mining with PMR-2A mines, while numbers 9b, 13, 14 and 15 also give four variants, this time using PROM-1 mines. Only one variant is given for PMR-3 mines, and this is in Appendix 9c. It is not recommended with PMR-2A, PROM-1 and PMR-3 mines following this same principle, since there are then four or five groups of mines per square kilometer of minefield, and there is then a large open space between the groups of mines in the minefield. This density of mining yields half the obstructive value of the previous one, but fewer mines are laid per square kilometer.

Appendices 9a, 9b and 9c show a layout in which the mines are laid in rows running laterally and depthwise of the minefield. This layout requires more mines per square kilometer than the layouts given in Appendices 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15. The layout shown in Appendix 16 under a and b requires 289 PMR-2A or 196 PROM-1 mines per square kilometer, which is not a large number of mines. If we use this layout to mine 100 km², we would need 28,900 PMR-2A, 19,600 PROM-1 or 4,900 PMR-3, which is acceptable on the whole.

The layout shown in Appendices 10, 11 and 12 all require fewer mines per square kilometer than the layout shown in Appendix 8a. When there is a shortage of materiel for mining, it is better to lay the minefields in this manner, since fewer mines are laid per square kilometer, as we have said. If we were to lay an area of 100 km² with the designs shown in Appendices 10, 11 and 12, we would need 17,500, 12,600 or 16,800 PMR-2A mines, respectively, which is between 16,300 and 11,400 mines fewer per 100 km².

The same layouts are shown in Appendices 13, 14 and 15, except that PROM-1 mines have been laid. This layout (compared to that given under Appendix 8b) also needs fewer mines for the same reasons as indicated in the previous paragraph.

Aside from the fewer mines required, the layouts given in Appendices 10-15 also make it possible to lay minefields of varying widths and depths by combining groups of mines and adding them to one another.

The type of layout to be used will depend on the number of mines and the size of the area to be mined. If one has a slightly larger number of mines, the most favorable variant is to lay minefields with all three types of mines laid in rows (Appendix 9) or in groups of mines (Appendices 10 and 13).

So this method of mining does not yield a high obstructive value, since large areas have to be obstructed, and the purpose of mining is not to prevent a drop or landing, but to make it difficult for the airborne assault force to operate because it takes losses and is insecure in its movement; nonexplosive engineer obstacles and other obstacles are also used, so that on the whole a satisfactory obstacle density is achieved in the airdrop and landing zone. Because of the limited number of mines and the large area to be mined, this is in principle the method that will be most widely used in obstructing an airdrop and landing zone.

By high mine density in the minefield we mean a mutual placement of the mines so that the spheres of their kill effect touch. The principle of the mining is the same as for normal and low mine density, and the difference is only in the number of mines in the minefield and in the obstructive value. Data on the system of mining, the number of mines, the area of the kill effect, the obstructive value and other technical data are given in Appendices 16a, b and c, and 17, 18 and 19.

This layout gives a far higher obstructive value than normal and low density, and from the standpoint of obstacle effectiveness it is very good, but it requires a large number of mines. The two primary layouts yield a different number of mines per square kilometer when the same type of mine is used. In the first (Appendix 16) we need 1,089 PMR-2A, 625 PROM-1 or 400 PMR-3 per square kilometer. If minefields are laid in the second way, by groups of mines (Appendices 17, 18 and 19) we need fewer mines per square kilometer: 847 PMR-2A, 557 PROM-1 or 343 PMR-3.

Whichever layout we use, we need large numbers of mines per square kilometer. That is why this method of mining an airdrop and landing zone is not acceptable. It can be used, but only on very small areas, and then only if there is complete certainty that this will be the site for an airdrop or landing.

In our discussion so far we have dealt with the three standard densities of mines in the minefield per square kilometer, and we have given each of them in different densities. The maximum and minimum numbers of mines per square kilometer are as follows for all three levels: for PMR-2A the maximum density is 1,089 mines (Appendix 16a), while the minimum is 126 mines (Appendix 10); for PROM-1 the maximum density is 625 mines (Appendix 16b), while the minimum is 119 mines (Appendix 15); and for PMR-3 the maximum density is 400 mines (Appendix 16c), while the minimum is 49 mines (Appendix 9c).

The following factors are the most relevant when a decision is being made on which density to use: the supply of materiel, the units available, and the time; the importance and size of the area which is to be obstructed; the possibility of precise assessment of drop or landing sites; the purpose of antilanding combat, that is, is its task to disperse the airborne assault force before it groups, or to hold it until reinforcements arrive, are the airborne assault forces to be attacked by armored or infantry units, and from what direction is each to attack? In principle we can conclude that a potential airdrop and landing zone will be obstructed with low mine densities, normal densities will be used to a minimum, only at places where the airdrop or landing can be expected with high probability. If minefields 1 km² in size are laid, the variant shown in Appendices 10 and 13 is unacceptable, since it requires 224 PMR-2A or 147 PROM-1 per square kilometer.

The fundamental scheme for obstructing an airdrop or landing zone of an airborne division is shown in Appendix 20. In preparing the scheme we assumed that the zone is approximately 1,200 km² in size and that more than 50 percent of this space is unsuitable for the drop or landing of an airborne assault force. Given these conditions of the terrain and in view of the target and mission of the airborne assault force, airborne regiments do not have good opportunities to entirely change their landing zones. It is thus logical for obstacles to be erected only within regimental air landing zones, since there is no need to expand and cover potential reserve zones. In this situation it is possible that within the regimental zones battalions may alter their landing zones, and therefore in designing the obstacles we assumed that each battalion might choose two zones, and therefore within each regimental zone we would obstruct six battalion zones instead of three. Within each battalion zone 4 km² would be completely obstructed with low density, which means that within the regimental zone 24 km² would be completely obstructed, which is about 50 percent of its area, and within the division's zone this would make 72 km², or about 50 percent of the normal area envisaged for

the regiments of the airborne division. In addition to obstructing the airdrop or landing zone, one also obstructs the routes of the operation and zones of objectives of the attack by the airborne force, which on the whole increases the percentage for the airdrop and landing zone.

As for the objectives of the operation by the airborne division, we assumed that in this situation the airfield would be the principal objective of the operation. That is why the regiments operating against the airfield are assumed to be carrying the brunt of the attack of the airborne division, and the decisive points in erection of obstacles was adopted in that context. The materiel necessary on the basis of these conditions was computed as follows:

- i. the requirements to obstruct the airdrop and landing zone: 5,032 PMR-2A, 6,015 PROM-1 and 1,104 PMR-3 (a total of 12,151 trip-action antipersonnel fragmentation mines), 5,000 meters of obstacles consisting of piled elements (500 piles), 3,000 meters of low wire entanglements (19.5 tons of barbed wire);
- ii. to block the routes of the attack and obstruct the zone of the air assault force's objective one needs 8,800 antitank mines, 8,800 pressure-action antipersonnel mines, 7,500 meters of ditching to prevent the landing of aircraft, 2,000 meters of obstacles made up of tetrahedra and 1,500 meters of stakes and dragon's teeth and the like.

The layout of the various sites by zones, the types of obstacles, and the percentages are given in the explanations to Appendix 19.

This layout of obstacles corresponds to the given conditions, and the number of mines and other obstacles provides the necessary obstacle density. Should any of the conditions be changed, the layout of obstacles would also change and be adapted to the specific conditions.

If engineer preparation of potential enemy airdrop and landing zones is done under normal conditions, this obstacle density could be obtained in all probable airborne landing and drop zones for operational purposes. A variation or shortage of the particular elements should not essentially affect the obstacle densities, nor the quality of obstruction. A lack of tetrahedra should be made up for with ditches, stakes or similar obstacles, and if there is a shortage of antipersonnel mines, one should instead install more wire entanglements or other antipersonnel obstacles. In view of the importance of obstruction and the possibility of using diverse materials and improvisations, there should never be a situation in which there is nothing with which to erect obstructions. Obstruction of airborne landing and drop zones is a case when the use of diverse materials can be most effective. This type of obstruction takes more time and manpower in devising the obstacles.

When the situation is being assessed and determinations are being made of mine obstacles and other obstructions, the realistic tactical requirements should be assessed and a decision made as to whether the particular obstacles will provide the most essential obstacle density. If regulation materials are not adequate, a determination should be made as to which obstacles should be devised to supplement the explosive obstacles and as to the manpower and time for carrying out these operations. The great majority of such obstacles do not require manpower with special training; labor-conscription units and work organizations may also be used.


Key to Appendix 1:

1. Types of obstacles and appearance
2. Unit of measurement and quantity
3. Installation time per unit
4. Purpose
5. kom = pieces
6. elem = piles
7. rc = man-hours
8. rc mas. = machine-hours
9. rc K. R. = hours for trench digger


Appendix 1. Types of Nonexplosive Antipersonnel and Antitank Obstacles

VRSTA PREPREKE I IZGLED (1)	JED. MERE I KOLIČINA (2)	VREME IZRAD. ZA JED. MERE POSTAVLJANJE (3)	NAMENA (4)	VRSTA PREPREKE I IZGLED (1)	JED. MERE I KOLIČINA (2)	VREME IZRAD. ZA JED. MERE POSTAVLJANJE (3)	NAMENA (4)
Reinforced wire barrier	100m	64 rč	Against para- troops	Concrete tetrahedron	100kom	3rč maš.	Against aircraft and combat vehicles
3-row wire entanglement	100 m	120 rč	—“—	Ditch	100 m	0,5 rč K.R.	—“—
Low wire entanglement	100 m	100 rč	—“—	Driven wooden stakes	100 m	1250 rč	—“—
Wire-roll entanglement	100 m	10 rč	—“—	Dragon's teeth	100m	500 rč	—“—
Hedgehog	(5) 100 kom 100 m	100 rč	—“—	Iron tetrahedron	100 kom	5 rč maš.	—“—
Chevaux- de-frise	100 kom 500 m	200 rč	—“—	Concrete block (stone wedge)	100 kom	4 rč maš	—“—
Piled obstacles	(6) 100 elem 1.000 m	20 rč	—“—	Iron hedgehog	100 kom	3 rč maš	—“—

Appendix 2. Normal Density of Mines in a Minefield Consisting of Trip-Action Antipersonnel Mines (The Spheres of the Casualty Effect Are Touching)




Number of mines in row per kilometer of width of minefield	25
Number of rows per kilometer of depth of minefield	25
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	625
Area of mine's casualty radius	1,256 m ²
Total casualty area	785,000 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty radius	78.5%
Obstructive value or density of kill radius	44.1%



Number of mines in row per kilometer of width of minefield	20
Number of rows per kilometer of depth of minefield	20
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	400
Area of mine's casualty radius	1,962 m ²
Total casualty area	784,000 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty radius	78.5%
Obstructive value or density of kill radius	50.2%


Appendix 2 (continued)

c) PMR -3




Number of mines in row per kilometer of width of minefield	10
Number of rows per kilometer of depth of minefield	10
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	100
Area of mine's casualty radius	7,850 m ²
Total casualty area	785,000 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty radius	78.5%
Obstructive value or density of kill radius	19.6%

Appendix 3. Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PMR-2A; Normal Mine Density in the Minefield; Casualty Radii Touching




Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per kilometer of minefield's width	8
Number of groups per kilometer of minefield's depth	8
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	448
Area covered by mine group's casualty radius	8,792 m ²
Total casualty area	562,685 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	56.3%
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	31.6%

Appendix 4. Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PROM-1; Normal Mine Density in the Minefield; Casualty Radii Touching




Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per kilometer of minefield's width	7
Number of groups per kilometer of minefield's depth	7
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	343
Area covered by mine group's casualty radius	13,734 m ²
Total casualty area	672,966 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	67.3%
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	43.1%

Appendix 5. Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PMR-3; Normal Mine Density in the Minefield; Casualty Radii Touching



Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per kilometer of minefield's width	3
Number of groups per kilometer of minefield's depth	3
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	63
Area covered by mine group's casualty radius	54,950 m ²
Total casualty area	494,550 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	49.4%
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	12.4%


Appendix 6. Diagram for Marking the Location of Mines in the Group



Organization of the operation:

- i. the squad leader measures the angles;
- ii. soldiers 1 and 2 stretch the string (I and II) representing the kill and casualty radius of the mine's effect ($2r$) and drive in stakes;
- iii. soldiers 3 and 4 lay the mines, stretch the wires and tie them on to one another.


Appendix 7. Variant A--Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PMR-3; Normal Density of Mines in the Minefield; Casualty Radii Touching



Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per square kilometer of minefield	8
Number of mines required per square kilometer of minefield	56
Area of casualty effect of group of mines	54,950 m ²
Total area of casualty effect	439,600 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	43.9%
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	11.0%

Note: Low mine density with the PMR-3 is unsatisfactory because of the large interstices between the groups of mines in a minefield that is 1 km² in size.

Appendix 8. Variant A₂--Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PMR-3; Normal Density of Mines in the Minefield; Casualty Radii Touching




Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per square kilometer of minefield	9
Number of mines required per square kilometer of minefield	63
Area of casualty effect of group of mines	54,950 m ²
Total area of casualty effect	494,550 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	49.4%
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	12.3%

Note: Low mine density with the PMR-3 is unsatisfactory because of the large interstices between the groups of mines in a minefield that is 1 km² in size.


Appendix 9. Low Density of Mines in the Minefield With Trip-Action Anti-personnel Mines; Casualty Radii Do Not Touch, But Are Separated by One Radius

a) PMR - 2A




Number of mines in row per kilometer of width of minefield	17
Number of rows per kilometer of depth of minefield	17
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	289
Area of mine's casualty radius	1,256 m ²
Total casualty area	362,984 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty radius	36.3%
Obstructive value or density of kill radius	20.4%

b) PROM-1




Number of mines in row per kilometer of width of minefield	14
Number of rows per kilometer of depth of minefield	14
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	196
Area of mine's casualty radius	1,962 m ²
Total casualty area	384,552 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty radius	38.4%
Obstructive value or density of kill radius	24.6%

Appendix 9 (continued)




Number of mines in row per kilometer of width of minefield	7
Number of rows per kilometer of depth of minefield	7
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	49
Area of mine's casualty radius	7,850 m ²

Appendix 10. Variant C--Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PMR-2A; Low Density of Mines in the Minefield; Casualty Radii Touch Only Within the Group; Distance R Between Groups




Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per square kilometer of minefield	32
Number of mines required per square kilometer of minefield	224
Area of casualty effect of group of mines	8,792 m ²
Total area of casualty effect	281,344 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	28.1%
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	15.8%

Appendix 11. Variant C₂--Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PMR-2A; Low Density of Mines in the Minefield; Casualty Radii Touch Only Within the Group




Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per square kilometer of minefield	18
Number of mines required per square kilometer of minefield	126
Area of casualty effect of group of mines	8,792 m ²
Total area of casualty effect	158,256 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	15.8%
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	8.9%

Appendix 12. Variant C3--Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PMR-2A; Low Density of Mines in the Minefield; Casualty Radii Touch Only Within the Group




Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per square kilometer of minefield	24
Number of mines required per square kilometer of minefield	168
Area of casualty effect of group of mines	8,792 m ²
Total area of casualty effect	211,008 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	21.1%
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	11.8%

Appendix 13. Variant B₁--Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PROM-1; Low Density of Mines in the Minefield; Casualty Radii Touch Only Within the Group; Distance R Between Groups




Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per square kilometer of minefield	21
Number of mines required per square kilometer of minefield	147
Area of casualty effect of group of mines	$13,734 \text{ m}^2$
Total area of casualty effect	$288,414 \text{ m}^2$
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	29.0%
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	18.4%

Appendix 14. Variant B₂--Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PROM-1; Low Density of Mines in the Minefield; Casualty Radii Touch Only Within the Group




Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per square kilometer of minefield	20
Number of mines required per square kilometer of minefield	140
Area of casualty effect of group of mines	13,734 m ²
Total area of casualty effect	274,680 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	27.4%
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	17.5%

Appendix 15. Variant B₃--Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PROM-1; Low Density of Mines in the Minefield; Casualty Radii Touch Only Within the Group




Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per square kilometer of minefield	17
Number of mines required per square kilometer of minefield	119
Area of casualty effect of group of mines	13,734 m ²
Total area of casualty effect	233,478 m ²
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	23.3%
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	15.0%

Appendix 16. High Density of Mines in a Minefield Consisting of Trip-Action Antipersonnel Mines; Kill Radii Touching




Number of mines per kilometer in minefield's crosswise row	33
Number of rows per kilometer of minefield's depth	33
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	1,089
Area described by mine's kill radius	706 m ²
Total area covered by the kill radius	768,834 m ²
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	76.9%
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	98.6%




Number of mines per kilometer in minefield's crosswise row	25
Number of rows per kilometer of minefield's depth	25
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	625
Area described by mine's kill radius	1,256 m ²
Total area covered by the kill radius	785,000 m ²
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	78.5%
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	96.8%

Appendix 16 (continued)




Number of mines per kilometer in minefield's crosswise row	20
Number of rows per kilometer of minefield's depth	20
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	400
Area described by mine's kill radius	1,962 m ²
Total area covered by the kill radius	784,800 m ²
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	78.5%
Obstructive value or density of casualty effect	100.0%

Appendix 17. Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PMR-2A Mines; High Density of Mines in the Minefield; Kill Radii Touching




Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per kilometer crosswise of minefield	11
Number of groups per kilometer depthwise of minefield	11
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	847
Area covered by kill effect of group of mines	4,942 m ²
Total area covered by kill effect	597,982 m ²
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	59.8%

Appendix 18. Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PROM-1 Mines; High Density of Mines in the Minefield; Kill Radii Touching



Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per kilometer crosswise of minefield	9
Number of groups per kilometer depthwise of minefield	9
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	567
Area covered by kill effect of group of mines	8,792 m ²
Total area covered by kill effect	712,152 m ²
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	71.2%


Appendix 19. Layout of a Minefield Consisting of PMR-3 Mines; High Density of Mines in the Minefield; Kill Radii Touching



Number of mines in group	7
Number of groups per kilometer crosswise of minefield	7
Number of groups per kilometer depthwise of minefield	7
Number of mines needed per square kilometer of minefield	343
Area covered by kill effect of group of mines	13,734 m ²
Total area covered by kill effect	672,966 m ²
Obstructive value or density of kill effect	67.3%

Appendix 20. Diagram of Obstruction of an Airdrop and Landing Zone for an Airborne Division

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Key to Appendix 20:

1. Minefield consisting of trip-action antipersonnel mines
2. Mixed minefield (antitank mines and trip-action antipersonnel mines)
3. Obstacles consisting of piled elements
4. Low wire entanglements
5. Ditches to obstruct aircraft
6. Tetrahedra to obstruct aircraft and armored vehicles
7. Stakes to obstruct aircraft and armored vehicles
8. Airfield prepared for demolition
9. Minefield with normal mine density
10. Minefield with low mine density
11. Minefields along the routes of the airborne assault force's action and in the zone of targets

7045
CSO: 2800

YUGOSLAVIA

REGULATION OF UNDERWATER ACTIVITIES IN COASTAL WATERS

Belgrade SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ in Serbo-Croatian No 1, 7 Jan 77 pp 2-5

[Regulation issued by Franjo Herljевич, federal secretary for internal affairs, on 6 December 1976 in Belgrade]

[Text] Article 1

This regulation sets forth the conditions under which individuals, government agencies, organizations of associated labor and other organizations may perform underwater activities in Yugoslav coastal waters.

Article 2

In the terms of this regulation underwater activities are as follows: diving using diving equipment, the taking of photographs beneath the surface of the sea, the shooting of films beneath the surface of the sea, and any study of the characteristics of the sea and the features of the seabed.

Individuals, agencies and organizations engaging in the underwater activities referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article must visibly mark the area in which these activities are being performed. The marker shall be a yellow sphere 0.50 cm in diameter which shall be placed on the surface of the water in the center of the zone.

When there is a single diver, he must attach the line from the float marker to his belt, so that the float moves as he moves, and when there is more than one diver, the spherical floats must be placed to make a triangle.

Article 3

In the context of this regulation the term "diving with diving equipment" refers to submersion beneath the surface of the sea with self-contained diving equipment with compressed air or equipment in which a gas mixture for breathing is supplied from the surface.

In the context of this regulation self-contained diving equipment refers to diving apparatus, a diver's suit with appurtenant equipment for breathing underwater, a diver's watch, a depth finder, a compass, a knife and lead weights, as well as a first-aid kit.

In the context of this regulation the term "taking pictures under the surface of the sea" refers to the taking of still photographs with a camera (black-and-white or color).

In the context of this regulation the term "shooting of films under the surface of the sea" refers to the underwater shooting of documentary, scientific and other films, with either movie cameras or underwater television cameras.

In the context of this regulation the term "study of the characteristics of the sea and features of the seabed" refers to any gathering of data in oceanographic, biological, geological, speleological, hydrographic, hydrometeorological, geomagnetic, gravimetric and other research of the characteristics of the sea and features of the seabed.

Article 4

It is prohibited to perform the underwater activities referred to in Article 2 of this regulation in the following locations:

a) in the parts of Yugoslav coastal waters bounded by the lines defined by these points:

- 1) A Lat = $42^{\circ}25'54''$ N Long = $18^{\circ}41'45''$ E (Tivat Bay)
B Lat = $42^{\circ}25'51''$ N Long = $18^{\circ}41'23''$ E (Tivat Bay)
C Lat = $42^{\circ}26'12''$ N Long = $18^{\circ}41'18''$ E (Tivat Bay)
D Lat = $42^{\circ}26'21''$ N Long = $18^{\circ}41'30''$ E (Tivat Bay)
- 2) A Lat = $42^{\circ}46'20''$ N Long = $17^{\circ}52'35''$ E (Cape Gornji)
B Lat = $42^{\circ}41'57''$ N Long = $17^{\circ}57'00''$ E (Sveti Mihailo Crag)
C Lat = $42^{\circ}41'18''$ N Long = $17^{\circ}55'30''$ E (Lopud Island-Cape Benesin)
D Lat = $42^{\circ}43'35''$ N Long = $17^{\circ}50'36''$ E (Jakljan Island-Cape Sokolic)
E Lat = $42^{\circ}45'36''$ N Long = $17^{\circ}45'48''$ E (Peljesac Peninsula-Cape Vratnik)
- 3) A Lat = $43^{\circ}02'55''$ N Long = $17^{\circ}00'15''$ E (Peljesac Peninsula-Cape Lovisce)
B Lat = $42^{\circ}58'25''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}59'50''$ E (Korcula Island-Samograd Cove)
C Lat = $42^{\circ}55'12''$ N Long = $17^{\circ}12'12''$ E (Korcula Island-Cape Raznjic)
D Lat = $42^{\circ}56'25''$ N Long = $17^{\circ}18'36''$ E (Peljesac Peninsula-Zalaz Cove)

4) A Lat = $43^{\circ}02'25''$ N Long = $17^{\circ}24'25''$ E (Cape Visnjica)
 B Lat = $43^{\circ}01'32''$ N Long = $17^{\circ}10'18''$ E (Cape Duba-Mali Ston Channel)

5) A Lat = $43^{\circ}20'00''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}24'48''$ E (southwestern portion of Brac Island, including the Splitska Vrata Strait)
 B Lat = $43^{\circ}20'00''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}24'10''$ E
 C Lat = $43^{\circ}19'27''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}23'26''$ E
 D Lat = $43^{\circ}18'54''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}23'24''$ E
 E Lat = $43^{\circ}15'40''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}32'10''$ E
 F Lat = $43^{\circ}16'06''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}32'24''$ E "

6) A Lat = $42^{\circ}40'00''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}41'00''$ E (area around Lastovo Island)
 B Lat = $42^{\circ}40'00''$ N Long = $17^{\circ}00'00''$ E
 C Lat = $42^{\circ}49'00''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}41'00''$ E
 D Lat = $42^{\circ}49'00''$ N Long = $17^{\circ}00'00''$ E "

7) A Lat = $42^{\circ}55'00''$ N Long = $15^{\circ}55'00''$ E (area around Vis Island)
 B Lat = $42^{\circ}55'00''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}20'00''$ E (area around Vis Island)
 C Lat = $43^{\circ}08'00''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}20'00''$ E (area around Vis Island)
 D Lat = $43^{\circ}08'00''$ N Long = $15^{\circ}55'00''$ E (area around Vis Island)

8) A Lat = $43^{\circ}29'30''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}23'35''$ E (Cape Jova)
 B Lat = $43^{\circ}30'30''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}23'34''$ E (Cape Marjan-Kastelan Bay)

9) A Lat = $43^{\circ}38'55''$ N Long = $15^{\circ}54'18''$ E (Cape Ostrica Vela)
 B Lat = $43^{\circ}38'00''$ N Long = $15^{\circ}54'00''$ E
 C Lat = $43^{\circ}27'00''$ N Long = $15^{\circ}54'00''$ E
 D Lat = $43^{\circ}23'20''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}12'20''$ E (Solta Island-Cape Gaj)
 E Lat = $43^{\circ}24'48''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}12'00''$ E (Solta Island-Cape Obinuski Bok)
 F Lat = $43^{\circ}29'45''$ N Long = $16^{\circ}10'48''$ E (Cape Jelinak)

10) A Lat = $43^{\circ}41'20''$ N Long = $15^{\circ}31'12''$ E (Kurba Vela Island-Cape Mede)
 B Lat = $43^{\circ}37'25''$ N Long = $15^{\circ}34'24''$ E (Blitvenica Light)
 C Lat = $43^{\circ}33'00''$ N Long = $15^{\circ}42'00''$ E (area of Zirja Island)
 D Lat = $43^{\circ}38'00''$ N Long = $15^{\circ}47'00''$ E (area of Zirja Island)
 E Lat = $43^{\circ}44'00''$ N Long = $15^{\circ}41'00''$ E (area of Zirja Island)

11) A Lat = $44^{\circ}29'36''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}30'12''$ E (Losinj Island-Balvanida Harbor)
 B Lat = $44^{\circ}26'00''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}26'00''$ E
 C Lat = $44^{\circ}09'06''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}49'18''$ E (Veli Rat Light)
 D Lat = $44^{\circ}08'24''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}54'48''$ E (Dugi Otok Island-Cape Sveta Nedjelja)
 E Lat = $44^{\circ}08'36''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}56'50''$ E
 F Lat = $44^{\circ}12'12''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}56'36''$ E (southern promontory of Sestrunga Island)
 G Lat = $44^{\circ}12'48''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}54'40''$ E (Molat Island-Stapanji Promontory)

H Lat = $44^{\circ}20'50''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}043'24''$ E (Silba Island-Juzni Arat)
 I Lat = $44^{\circ}26'50''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}34'55''$ E (Ilovik Island-Cape Radovan)
 J Lat = $44^{\circ}29'36''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}32'36''$ E (Losinj Island-Trasorka Cove)

12) A Lat = $44^{\circ}048'15''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}00'12''$ E (Cape Marlera)
 B Lat = $44^{\circ}048'00''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}06'15''$ E
 C Lat = $44^{\circ}055'00''$ N Long = $15^{\circ}06'00''$ E
 D Lat = $44^{\circ}055'10''$ N Long = $14^{\circ}02'20''$ E (Cape Kavalo)

13) A Lat = $44^{\circ}058'55''$ N Long = $13^{\circ}044'00''$ E (Cape Barbariga)
 B Lat = $44^{\circ}057'00''$ N Long = $13^{\circ}038'00''$ E
 C Lat = $44^{\circ}052'00''$ N Long = $13^{\circ}042'00''$ E
 D Lat = $44^{\circ}051'40''$ N Long = $13^{\circ}048'05''$ E (Cape Brankorsko)

14) A Lat = $45^{\circ}036'24''$ N Long = $13^{\circ}041'50''$ E
 B Lat = $45^{\circ}035'24''$ N Long = $13^{\circ}042'12''$ E (Cape Debeli)
 C Lat = $45^{\circ}035'32''$ N Long = $13^{\circ}043'28''$ E (Italian border);

b) in areas that lie within a zone of the sea 300 meters wide and bounded by the following shore points:

1) A Lat = $42^{\circ}024'30''$ N Long = $18^{\circ}030'34''$ E (Prevlaka Cove)
 B Lat = $42^{\circ}028'40''$ N Long = $18^{\circ}023'30''$ E (Cape Rostova)

2) A Lat = $42^{\circ}24'39''$ N Long = $18^{\circ}39'27''$ E (the village Donji Krasici)
 B Lat = $42^{\circ}24'39''$ N Long = $18^{\circ}33'02''$ E (Cape Dobrec);

c) in the area representing a zone of the sea 300 meters wide extending from the shore of Mljet Island, between Cape Hljeb (Lat = $42^{\circ}45'18''$ N and Long = $17^{\circ}25'00''$ E) to Cape Goli, the entire inner side of Mljet Island, from Cape Goli to Cape Grui and continuing on the outer side to Cape Zaglavac (Lat = $42^{\circ}41'30''$ N and Long = $17^{\circ}42'34''$ E);

d) in portions of coastal waters within 300 meters of the coast of Grgur and Goli islands;

e) in portions of coastal waters included within harbors open to public transportation and along the customary sea lanes used by shipping;

f) in portions of coastal waters within 300 meters of a naval vessel, within naval harbors, and immediately opposite the shore where a military facility is marked or enclosed.

In the portions of coastal waters referred under Points e and f of this article skin diving without equipment is also prohibited.

Article 5

In exceptional cases Yugoslav citizens and organizations of associated labor and other organizations may dive with diving equipment and take photographs under the surface of the sea in the portions of coastal waters referred to in Article 4 of this regulation if they obtain a permit from the competent agency in the republic as designated by republic statutes. Such permission shall be granted in agreement with the authorized national defense agency.

On the basis of the permit from the competent agency referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article Yugoslav citizens and organizations of associated labor and other organizations may also shoot films under the surface of the sea and study the characteristics of the sea and features of the seabed in the portions of coastal waters referred to in Article 4, Paragraph 1, Points a, b, c, d and e, of this regulation.

Article 6

In portions of coastal waters which have not been covered by the provisions of Article 4 of this regulation Yugoslav citizens may dive with diving equipment and take photographs beneath the surface of the sea without a permit, and foreign nationals may do so with a permit.

Yugoslav citizens may dive with diving equipment and take photographs beneath the surface of the sea if they are members of one of the divers' organizations (society or club) affiliated with the League for Underwater Activities and Deep-Sea Fishing of Yugoslavia and if they have the appropriate diver's certificate.

The permit referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall be issued by the competent agency in the republic designated by republic statutes, which shall also define the immediate area in which the foreign national is allowed to engage in underwater activities and the period of the permit's validity, which may not be longer than 1 year.

The permit referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article may be issued only to an individual, but not to a group of divers or foreign diving club or divers' training school.

Article 7

A permit is required for the shooting of films under the surface of the sea and for studying the characteristics of the sea and features of the seabed even when these underwater activities are done outside the areas referred to in Article 4 of this regulation. That permission is issued by the competent agency in the republic designated by republic statutes.

Article 8

The application for permission to shoot films beneath the surface of the sea and the application to study the characteristics of the sea and features of the seabed in Yugoslav coastal waters should contain the following: the first and last name of the individual or the name of the organization of associated labor or other organization submitting the application; the type of film or type of research which is intended; the portions of coastal waters or underwater area in which the filming or research will be done; the technical equipment which will be used and the time when the filming or research will be done.

Article 9

Government agencies, organizations of associated labor and other organizations may publish or make available to foreign users the results of studies of characteristics of the sea and features of the seabed done in Yugoslav coastal waters only if they obtain relevant permission from the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

Article 10

The provisions of this regulation do not apply to underwater activities performed by the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Article 11

A fine not to exceed 10,000 dinars shall be imposed for a misdemeanor upon an organization of associated labor or other juridical person:

- 1) if without authorization it performs underwater activities in portions of coastal waters covered by the provisions of Article 4 of this regulation;
- 2) if without permission it shoots films beneath the surface of the sea and studies the characteristics of the sea and features of the seabed (Article 7);
- 3) if without permission it publishes or makes available to foreign users the results of a study of the characteristics of the sea and features of the seabed done in Yugoslav coastal waters (Article 9).

A fine not to exceed 2,000 dinars shall also be imposed for a misdemeanor as referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article upon the responsible individual in the organization of associated labor or other juridical person.

Article 12

A fine not to exceed 2,000 dinars shall be imposed for a misdemeanor upon an individual in the following cases:

- 1) if when performing underwater activities he does not mark the location as provided for in Article 2, Paragraphs 2 and 3, of this regulation;
- 2) if in diving he uses a type of self-contained diving equipment which is not envisaged in Article 2 [sic], Paragraph 2, of this regulation;
- 3) if in the portions of Yugoslav coastal waters enumerated in Article 4 of this regulation he dives with diving equipment and takes photographs beneath the surface of the sea without permission;
- 4) if in the portions of Yugoslav coastal waters enumerated in Article 4, Paragraph 1, Points e and f, he engages in skin diving without equipment (Article 4, Paragraph 2);
- 5) if he shoots films beneath the surface of the sea or studies the characteristics of the sea and features of the seabed in Yugoslav coastal waters without permission.

The fine referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall be imposed for a misdemeanor upon a foreign national who dives using diving equipment and takes photographs beneath the surface of the sea in portions of Yugoslav coastal waters other than those enumerated in Article 4 of this regulation without permission and in cases when he performs such activities at a place other than the place indicated in the permit.

Article 13

The regulation on Performance of Underwater Activities in Yugoslav Coastal Waters (SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, Nos 31, 1967, and 26, 1970) shall cease to be valid on the date when this regulation takes effect.

Article 14

This regulation shall take effect on the eighth day after publication in SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ.

7045
CSO: 2800

YUGOSLAVIA

BRIEFS

HOSTILE PROPAGANDA SENTENCE--Mirko Kovacevic, born in 1939 in the Ljuboce village near Tuzla, assistant director of the secondary education center in Zivinice, was sentenced yesterday to 8 years of rigorous imprisonment for the criminal act of hostile propaganda (article 118, paragraph 1 of the penal code). The sentence was pronounced by the Criminal Council in Sarajevo which was presided over by Judge Rizah Hadzic. Mirko Kovacevic worked from February 1974 to September 1975 as a physics and general technical education teacher at the First Sarajevo High School. In the verdict it is cited that during his stay in Sarajevo acting from counter-revolutionary, nationalist and technocratic-bureaucratic positions, Kovacevic carried out propaganda and most blatantly attacked socialist self-management, equality, brotherhood and unity of our peoples and the non-aligned policy. He insulted in a most blatant way the highest government leaders with the aim of changing the state and social structure, of destroying brotherhood and unity of Yugoslav people by force, contrary to the constitution. [Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 77 p 4]

CSO: 2800

END